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THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM

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
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# ORIENTAL INTERPRE- TATIONS OF THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM

[Lectures on the Harris Foundation 1925]

*By*

MICHIMASA SOYESHIMA

Former Member of the Japanese House of Peers

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## PREFACE

The Harris Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago have been made possible through the generosity of the heirs of Norman Wait Harris and Emma Gale Harris, who donated to the University a fund to be known as "The Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation" on January 27, 1923. The letter of gift contains the following statement:

It is apparent that a knowledge of world-affairs was never of more importance to Americans than today. The spirit of distrust which pervades the Old World is not without its effect upon our own country. How to combat this disintegrating tendency is a problem worthy of the most serious thought. Perhaps one of the best methods is the promotion of a better understanding of other nations through wisely directed educational effort.

The purpose of the Foundation shall be the promotion of a better understanding on the part of American citizens of the other peoples of the world, thus establishing a basis for improved international relations and a more enlightened world-order. The aim shall always be to give accurate information, not to propagate opinion.

In fulfilment of this object a First Institute was held at the University of Chicago in the summer of 1924, and the public lectures delivered by

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the foreign scholars invited to the Institute were published: *Germany in Transition*, by Herbert Kraus; *The Stabilization of Europe*, by Charles De Visscher; and *The Occident and the Orient*, by Sir Valentine Chirol.

For the Second Institute, held in the summer of 1925, the topic selected for discussion was the Far East, and again the public lectures delivered as part of the work of the Institute are published in essentially their original form. This volume, *Oriental Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problem*, contains the lectures of Count Michimasa Soyeshima, graduate of Cambridge University, England, and former member of the House of Peers of Japan; and of Dr. P. W. Kuo, President of Southeastern University, Nanking, China. A second volume, entitled *Occidental Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problem*, gives the lectures of Mr. H. G. W. Woodhead, C.B.E., an Englishman of twenty years' residence in China where he was editor of the *Peking and Tientsin Times* and of the *China Year Book*; of Mr. Julean Arnold, American Consul or Commercial Attaché in China since 1902, and editor of the *Commercial Year Book of China*, and of Mr. H. K. Norton, author of *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia*.

August 1, 1925



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JAPAN, THE FAR EAST, AND THE  
UNITED STATES

*By* MICHIMASI SOYESHIMA





# I

## POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF MODERN JAPAN

It is seventy-one years since Commodore Matthew Perry, of the United States Navy, knocked at the door of Japan, which slowly turned on its hinges, creaking with the rust of centuries.

It is certainly one of the most interesting and, at the same time, most perplexing problems for the historian that a country given over to a form of medieval feudalism for several centuries should become, within the lifetime of a man, one of the five Great Powers, possessing an army and a navy second to none in efficiency, and also one of the most democratic countries of the world, with a constitution based upon universal suffrage; and yet should remain an empire reigned over and governed by an emperor, the one hundred and twenty-second in the dynasty, which tradition carries back 2,585 years. But the facts are quite clear and simple. The Japanese have always been a virile race, and in the days of feudalism even women and children received very strenuous training—the

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former chiefly mental and the latter both mental and physical; they have been governed by a line of emperors whose motto has always been "The ruler governs for the sake of the people"; and, therefore, the people have always been loyal toward the imperial family, as is fortunately still the case.

As early as 1290, Marco Polo, writing from China concerning the kingdom of Zipangu (which was then the Chinese way of pronouncing Nippon-Koku, or the "country of the Rising Sun," said: "Zipangu is an island towards the East. . . . The people are highly civilized and well-favoured, . . . and I can tell you the quantity of gold they have is enormous." This gold no longer exists, for, thanks to the foreign adventurers, long before the advent of Commodore Perry it had all been drained away. St. Francis Xavier, who came to the Empire of the Rising Sun in 1549, wrote:

The nation with which we have had to do here surpasses in goodness any of the nations ever discovered. They are of a kindly disposition, not at all given to cheating, wonderfully desirous of honour and rank. Honour with them is placed above everything else. They never bear an insult either in word or deed. They listen with great avidity to discourse about God and divine things, especially when they can well understand what you say. Of all nations I have ever seen I cannot remember ever to have found any, either Christian or heathen, so averse to theft.

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In the Introduction to his *History of Japan*, published in London in 1727, Kaempfer wrote:

It gives an account of a Mighty and Powerful Empire. It describes a Valiant and Invincible Nation, an Industrious and Virtuous People, Possessed of a Country on which Nature hath lavished Her Most Valuable Treasures.

Hon. John W. Foster, in his *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, says:

The testimony of all writers is that the Japanese in their intercourse with foreigners were distinguished for high-bred courtesy combined with refined liberality and generous hospitality. On the other hand, the merchants and mariners with whom they came into contact were usually of bad manners and morals, overreaching, avaricious, and cruel; the missionaries were often arrogant, ambitious, and without proper respect for native customs; and the naval and other officials of foreign governments were haughty, actuated by a spirit of aggression, and unmindful of the amity of nations. The history of the time shows that the policy of exclusion adopted by Japan in the seventeenth century was not inherent in the constitution of the state or the character of the people, but that it was adopted in consequence of the unfavourable character of the relations with Europeans.

I have quoted from these well-known people who have written about Japan during the last seven centuries, not because I feel that she deserves all this eulogy, but because no nation is more misunderstood in America than the Japanese.

When the late Emperor Meiji came to the

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throne of Japan he promulgated an oath consisting of five articles, by which his subjects have been guided during the last fifty-seven years. The Oath of Five Articles, as it is called, runs as follows:

1. An Assembly widely convoked shall be established, and all affairs of State decided by impartial discussion.
2. All administrative matters of State shall be conducted by the co-operative efforts of the governing and the governed.
3. All the people shall be given opportunity to satisfy their legitimate desire.
4. All absurd usages shall be abandoned, and justice and righteousness shall regulate all actions.
5. Knowledge and learning shall be sought for all over the world, and thus the foundations of the Imperial Polity be greatly strengthened.

Thirteen years later an imperial edict was issued, promising the convention of a national assembly, and in another ten years the first parliament or, as the Japanese word for it is generally translated into English, "Imperial Diet," was summoned. No student of Oriental problems can understand the political tendencies of modern Japan unless he is prepared to study in all its phases the effect of this bodily transplantation of the parliamentary form of government.

First of all, let me explain briefly the nature of the constitution as it was first framed. Its provisions were none too liberal, for, although the



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minimum age for electors and elected was twenty-five, there was also a property qualification of 15 *yen*, or \$7.50, per annum paid in direct national taxation. Since the purchasing power of the *yen* was then eight or nine times its present value, this was equivalent to over 100 *yen* in modern currency. There were two houses, namely, the House of Peers and the House of Representatives. The former was in part hereditary, in part elective, and in part nominated by the emperor, while the latter consisted of three hundred members elected by about four hundred and fifty thousand voters in a nation of over thirty-five million, which was then the population of Japan. As was naturally to be expected, a fierce struggle for the extension of suffrage soon began, and ten years later the franchise was extended to those who paid a direct national tax of 10 *yen*. In 1920, the qualification was lowered to 3 *yen*, giving the country an electorate of about three million in a population of over fifty million. This franchise remained in force until March of the present year, when the Universal Suffrage Bill was passed. The next election will be conducted on the basis of this new election law, which will give the vote to about twelve million and five hundred thousand males who are over the age of twenty-five.

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It is now thirty-six years since the constitution was granted to his people by the great Emperor Meiji; but constitutional government or party government, in the strict sense of these terms, has never existed, although the use of party organization was first started as early as in the year 1878 by a well-known liberal, Taisuke Itagaki, who afterward was raised to the peerage with the title of "Count." This democrat at first absolutely refused to accept the honor the emperor had conferred upon him; but as no Japanese subject was supposed to disobey an imperial command, a word from the late emperor was enough to make him join the privileged class. He was, however, one of those to whom "the plain appellation of 'Mr.' had a more majestic sound than the proudest of feudal titles." True to his principle, he died very poor and, although he had a son of mature age, on his deathbed he expressed the wish that his imperial master would kindly permit the peerage to become extinct—a wish with which His Majesty was gracious enough to comply.

Count Itagaki's movement was taken up almost simultaneously by another progressive, the late Marquis Okuma, whose name is well known in America. This statesman, who twice became prime minister and who was one of the authors of the

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famous Twenty-one Demands on China, can hardly be called a liberal, for, although in his conversations and speeches he was a democrat of the most advanced type, as premier his internal policy was always marked by conservatism and his foreign policy by extreme jingoism; also, unlike Itagaki, he was opulent and lived the life of a prince. Nothing was more self-contradictory than the way in which this well-known statesman thought, spoke, and acted. With all his faults, however, this much is certain, that to him and to Count Itagaki we owe the present growth of democratic ideas in Japan.

During the ten years which elapsed between the promulgation of the imperial promise of a popular legislative assembly and its actual establishment in 1891, the parties led respectively by Itagaki and Okuma carried on a vigorous propaganda with a view to future action. Thus, when the first Diet met it was found that these parties together had an overwhelming majority over the supporters of the government. The opposition was so strong and refractory that there was nothing left for the government but to dissolve the Diet in little more than a year after it came into existence.

The general election which followed was unfortunately marked by government interference. Those in authority seemed to have forgotten en-

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tirely the indisputable constitutional principle that "no power exists for the sake of the holder," and liberty of speech was subjected to most unfair and stringent regulation. At one time it looked as if there was going to be a political struggle of tremendous proportions threatening the very foundations of the empire. However, in less than three years the war with China came, and from the moment hostilities commenced to the conclusion of peace the nation was unanimous in its support of the government.

When it became known, however, that the government had accepted the "friendly advice" of Germany, France, and Russia to forego the legitimate fruits of victory, the exasperation of the people knew no bounds, and ominous clouds began to loom once again on the political horizon, increasing in magnitude each year. In 1898, that able and far-sighted statesman, Marquis Ito, who was then the premier, came to the conclusion that the best thing for the country would be to give a chance to the party leaders, and consequently he recommended to Emperor Meiji that he summon Okuma and Itagaki to the imperial presence and command them to form a ministry. The two leaders of the democratic parties, for the first time in the history of Japan, formed a cabinet based on popular sup-

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port, with Okuma as premier. But its life was very short, for it was soon evident that, although the two leaders were capable men, their followers were absolutely inexperienced in administering the affairs of the state. Besides, there soon arose a strong conflict of opinion between the two leaders, and the ministry came to an end in four months.

This first party government, which has left an unenviable name in the political history of Japan, was succeeded once again by a bureaucratic or clan government. Two years later the sagacious Marquis Ito came to realize that for the successful working of constitutional government it was essential to have the support of a political party, but that the existing parties were too inexperienced, as had been proved by the Okuma ministry. He, therefore, decided to form a new political party and to summon all patriots to rally to his banner. Unfortunately, however, the nucleus of the party comprised the majority of the liberal party hitherto led by Itagaki, who had just retired from the political arena.

Ito had further come to the conclusion that for the successful administration of public affairs it was essential to create well-organized public opinion, though at the same time he had no intention of establishing a party government which

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should be responsible to the people. He still adhered to the principle of the constitution that the government is responsible to the sovereign, and therefore he asserted that the appointment or dismissal of cabinet ministers belonged to the prerogatives of the emperor. The chief motive of Ito in forming a political party is clearly exposed by his subsequent action. He had formed his party, not because he had been converted to the principle of party government, but because he had come to the conclusion that the party system was more convenient from the viewpoint of the government. He did not consider it as "a control, issuing immediately from the people." He abhorred the idea that the government derived its power from the people; in all his public and private utterances he strongly asserted that it emanated from the sovereign.

In October, 1900, Prince Yamagata, who was then the prime minister, recommended to the Emperor that he intrust Ito with the duty of forming a cabinet. As had been expected by that shrewd soldier-statesman who had a large following in the House of Peers, the upper house showed an uncompromising hostility toward the new government, the very idea of party being detestable to them. Nearly every government measure was in danger of being rejected. Ito appealed to the Em-



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peror, who, by issuing an imperial rescript, pacified the Peers; but it was evident that the ministry could not pull through another session, and it soon came to an end.

Ito was succeeded by General Katsura, afterward Prince Katsura, the author of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the statesman who conducted the Russo-Japanese War. The political parties which were usually in opposition to one another now formed an alliance against this militaristic government, and made it so uncomfortable for Ito (who was a bureaucrat himself at heart) that he resigned the leadership of his party and became president of the Privy Council. The session of 1903 lasted only two days. Negotiations had been going on between Russia and Japan concerning Korea and Manchuria, and the government, which was most anxious to preserve the peace of the East, had been conceding point after point to Russia until it became quite unbearable for the nation. The session of the Diet is customarily opened by a speech from the throne, to which an humble reply is made from each House, the drawing up of which is intrusted to the respective presidents. The wording of the reply is almost exactly the same each year, and it is carried unanimously with the members respectfully standing.



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On this occasion, however, the President of the lower house was so enraged with the Russian policy of the government that he read a reply which he himself had secretly prepared, and in which he condemned the government's lukewarm policy toward Russia. The House did not notice this until the reply had been unanimously carried amid profound and respectful silence. Suddenly the House realized that there was something unusual in its wording; but it was too late, for it had been unanimously and reverentially passed. There was nothing left for the government but to dissolve the Diet after it had been in session only two days.

The war with Russia once more brought the nation together, and for two years almost every government measure was passed unanimously.

Between 1906 and 1911, Prince Katsura, who was a militarist and a bureaucrat, and Prince Saionji, who had succeeded Ito as leader of the party founded by that statesman and who is the only *Genro*, or "elder statesman," now living, by some mysterious arrangement held the portfolio of prime minister by turns; but in 1912 Admiral Yamamoto, who was a very strong statesman and who was thought to be the most capable man to weather the approaching political storm, formed a very powerful ministry. Although he was support-

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ed in the lower house by the majority party, a naval scandal was soon exposed and there was a general uproar against the government, with the result that the ministry came to grief.

Yamamoto was succeeded by Okuma, whose first diplomatic move was a very laudable one, for he took up arms for the cause of the Allies against the Germanic empires; but his second act was most deplorable, for he presented the famous Twenty-one Demands on China, of which nothing remains now but two articles and a bad name. Sixteen months later Okuma was turned out of power by the opposition of the elder statesmen and the House of Peers, who were strongly against his domestic and foreign policies.

Since the fall of the Okuma ministry there have been no less than seven cabinet changes. Of the seven prime ministers, two were party leaders and the remainder bureaucrats. In June of last year, the present cabinet came into existence, and although it is a coalition ministry of three great political parties, all the ministers except three are bureaucrats both by training and, I believe, also at heart. These parties have quite a large number of leaders in the lower house who are brilliant orators, sound business men, and well-known lawyers; but in selecting his colleagues, the Prime Minister had

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to resort to those who had received official training. Nor was his choice a surprise or a disappointment to the nation, for in Japan the officials, with all their shortcomings, are more upright and efficient than those who call themselves the "people's representatives."

I have dwelt at some length on the political history of Japan since the promulgation of the constitution, because I feel that in order to understand Japan's present political currents it is essential to have a rough idea about it. The sketches I have given will have shown you that "party government," "party cabinet," or "parliamentary government"—that is to say, government which represents the will of the majority of the people—has never really existed in Japan. But great changes are now taking place—changes which are fraught with tremendous possibilities and consequences, and in less than ten years the whole world will know whether Japan has adopted popular government or popular misgovernment.

That Japan has been wise in not adopting universal suffrage and party government until the present year has been proved by her bureaucratic achievements. Since the constitutional form of government was introduced thirty-six years ago, there have been twenty-four cabinet changes, of

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which only four were so-called "party governments," the rest having been headed by bureaucrats, or naval or military leaders. The wars with China and Russia were conducted by clan leaders, and in the negotiations which preceded the beginning of hostilities, in the conduct of these wars, in the peace negotiations, and in our post-bellum policy toward the powers, we justly commanded the respect and admiration of the world; but, unfortunately, just at the most important crisis in the history, not only of Japan, but also of the whole world, namely, during the Great War, Japan had the misfortune to be governed by a political party, which had no fixed principle but whose policy was simply to court the favor of the press and the populace. The indiscriminate conferring of decorations and the Twenty-one Demands are the more important examples of this policy, which has done incalculable harm to the fair name of Japan.

While the present lecturer is neither a bureaucrat nor a democrat, he feels it his duty to lay the bare facts before his audience and to say that, of the three parties which form the present coalition ministry, the majority party is the one which was in power when the world-war broke out. With all due respect to the able, upright, and honorable statesmen who compose the present ministry, the

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lecturer has some misgivings about the motive of the government in granting the universal franchise to the people, who are not yet ready for it and the overwhelming majority of whom are very indifferent about it. The present lecturer, in the last session of the Imperial Diet, put an interpellation to the Minister for Home Affairs, in which he had the audacity to say that universal suffrage was the outcome of political demonstrations by disappointed and intriguing politicians. The statement was strongly resented by the Minister, but in a few days the interpellator was the recipient of several letters and telegrams from perfect strangers and from various parts of the country indorsing the statement, but none accused him of having made a false statement. All the letters and telegrams received urged the lecturer to bring in an amendment granting the franchise only to the head—male or female—of every family, “for the strength of the nation,” they declared, “lies in its solidarity.” With us the individual is nothing; the family is everything, and the Japanese nation is one big family with the individual families as units and with the imperial household as the head of the great national family, possessing a history of three thousand years. This is the chief reason why the dynasty is regarded with such profound reverence.

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The granting of the vote to individuals will, it is feared by the opponents of universal suffrage, destroy the solidarity of the nation by weakening the units of which it is composed. Japan may be considered as one great communalistic state or one great feudal state, with the emperor as its supreme feudal lord.

The short constitutional history I have presented will have shown that Japan's recent history involves a continuous struggle between bureaucracy and democracy; but it must have shown also that in this struggle the former has almost always come out victoriously. The reason for this is not far to seek, for the government, being appointed by the emperor, has always had him on its side, and an imperial message has often been instrumental in averting political crises. But when Prince Katsura in his last ministry appealed too often to the Emperor for his support, a great demonstration took place in front of the Imperial Diet, and the statesman, who had rendered most meritorious services to the state, had to tender his resignation to his imperial master in utter despair and humiliation. The author of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Prime Minister who conducted the war with Russia was never pardoned by the people for his indiscretion in appealing too frequently to



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the Emperor for protection, and shortly afterward he died of cancer, an humbled and disappointed man, having been preceded to the grave, almost immediately before, by his brilliant only son, who had also succumbed to that malignant disease.

Before I proceed to discuss the merits and demerits of universal suffrage, I must say a few words concerning an institution which has been so powerful that it has actually wielded the scepter of the government during the last thirty years. It is the institution known as the *Genro*, or "elder statesmen," who constituted a body second only to the emperor in power. They were not a recognized body either in the constitution or in the laws of Japan, and were a group of men less than a half-dozen in number, all of whom had served the Emperor Meiji, whose trusted advisers they were. They were the makers or destroyers of cabinets. The present ministry came into existence through the recommendation of this body, which has always been a most conservative and restraining influence in the political affairs of Japan. There is only one member now in this institution, namely, Prince Saionji of the old nobility, whose family dates back about one thousand years. When he returned from France nearly a half-century ago, he was a very advanced liberal, but later he became a conserva-

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tive and is now gratified with the adoption of the laws pertaining to universal suffrage and the reform of the House of Peers.

The average age of the members of this body will show you how, by their extraordinary vitality and physical vigor, they were able to serve their emperor and country, for, with the exceptions of Prince Ito, who was killed by a Korean assassin in Manchuria, and Prince Katsura, all of them lived to the age of eighty-five and upward. The last member who died, Prince Matsukata, was ninety-two. At the time of the great earthquake he was at his country home in Kamakura, which was near the center of the disturbance. The venerable old gentleman was buried underneath the débris of his house by the first shock, and was rescued an hour later, none the worse for his terrible experience. Later he had an attack of pneumonia and was announced as dead, but by the sheer force of his will to pull through, he recovered completely. Six months later, he finally breathed his last, surrounded on his deathbed by his children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren, who are so numerous that when the late Empress asked the aged *Genro* about their total number, he humbly begged Her Majesty to give him time to investigate. I have mentioned this anecdote to show you that it

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was the wonderful vitality as well as the great mental power of the makers of modern Japan which has placed her in the position that it is her good fortune to hold today among the great powers of the world.

Truly the great Emperor Meiji sang:  
"Even to a high mountain rising  
sheer against the sky  
A way there may be for one who  
wills to climb."

During the last session of the Imperial Diet, two important bills were passed, namely, the Universal Suffrage Bill and the House of Peers Reform Bill. In order to understand the current political thought in Japan, it is essential to study the events which led up to the enactment of these laws.

When the ministry of the late Admiral Kato, whose name is probably remembered in America as Japan's chief delegate at the Washington Conference, came to grief by his sudden death, Princes Matsukata and Saionji, who were the only elder statesmen alive, most indiscreetly recommended to the Emperor the appointment of Admiral Yamamoto to the premiership. Even the appointment of Admiral Kato had been strongly resented by the people, and therefore it was only natural that they should oppose the appointment of a naval officer

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whose first ministry fell shortly before the world-war in consequence of a great naval scandal. As soon as it was announced that the *Genro* had recommended to the Emperor to command Admiral Yamamoto to form a ministry, there was much dissatisfaction in the press, and even the leaders of the House of Peers, most of whom have bureaucratic tendencies, refused to support him. The gallant admiral would never have succeeded in forming a cabinet but for the great earthquake. As I have stated before, the Japanese people act as one man in time of distress, and on the day following the great cataclysm the unpopular sailor-statesman was allowed to form a powerful ministry. It was, however, short-lived, for soon an event unprecedented in the history of Japan took place, namely, the attempt by a young fanatic to assassinate the Prince Regent. The whole nation was now in uproar against the government, during whose tenure of office such a dastardly act had taken place—an act destined to stain forever the glorious history of Japan. The ministry had nothing to do but resign in a body.

Most unwisely, some of the leaders of the House of Peers thought it their duty to approach the *Genro* and ask them to advise the Emperor to confer the portfolio of prime minister upon Viscount

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Kiyoura, who was then the president of the Privy Council and who is an uncompromising bureaucrat. This indiscreet advice was taken up by the *Genro*, and soon the Kiyoura ministry came into existence, supported by several of the leaders of the House of Peers. However, it was evident from the day of its formation that it was doomed. The people were now almost united in their condemnation of bureaucracy, and even the present lecturer thought it his duty to speak for two long hours in the House against the formation of a ministry of such unconstitutional character. The government soon dissolved the Diet and appealed to the nation, but it was as clear as daylight that the verdict of the country would be overwhelmingly against the ministry, which tendered its resignation as soon as the result of the general election became known.

Until the advent of the Yamamoto and Kiyoura ministries, the majority of the people were very indifferent about universal suffrage; nor did they consider it necessary to reform the House of Peers. When the late Mr. Hara dissolved the Diet and asked the opinion of the country concerning the question of universal suffrage, his party, which had been asserting that the time was not yet ripe for it, was returned to power with an overwhelming majority. However, in the last general election, in

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which the chief issues in the platform were the universal franchise and the reform of the House of Peers, the supporters of democracy gained a signal victory over their conservative opponents.

The Manhood Suffrage Bill, which the government introduced into the Imperial Diet in the last session, was to do away with the property qualification and to grant the vote to every male of twenty-five years of age and above, with certain disabilities enumerated in six clauses, of which the third clause, namely, the one disqualifying those who received monetary aid for the purpose of subsistence, became the center of dispute between the upper and lower houses. The purpose of the original government clause was simply to disqualify the paupers, but the upper chamber amended it to such an extent that the clause came to disqualify those who received any kind of pecuniary support, for the amendment was worded as follows: "people depending upon others for help or support." Had the amendment been adopted, about four million people would have been disqualified.

The Peers, being determined to recover or, at all events, test their failing strength, passed the amendment by an overwhelming majority, namely, 221 against 23. There was another amendment which the upper house had also passed by the same



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majority, namely, the extension of residential qualification from six months to one year. The two houses appointed special committees to sit in joint session in order to arrive at a compromise; but after several days' deliberation they could not find a solution. The Peers were very insistent on their amendments. The last day and the last hour of the session had arrived. The Prime Minister was obliged to ask the Emperor to prolong the session for one day with the object of pacifying the recalcitrant Peers; but the noble lords of Japan absolutely refused to give way! The press of the country was almost united in its condemnation of the attitude of the upper house. The last hour of the extended session had again arrived. The Prime Minister once more appealed to the Emperor, and the session was again prolonged, this time for two days. The Peers were, however, very firm, and the session had to be prolonged for another two days. When everybody had given up every hope of a compromise, the Peers suddenly condescended to meet the people's representatives halfway and the number of voters was decreased by about two million by the insertion of the words, "on account of poverty."

In the same way, the Peers thought it their duty to mutilate both the upper house Reform Bill and the budget, although the decrease in the

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amount of money was only about nine hundred and seventy thousand *yen*. Thus the first real party government which came into power by the will of the people and whose platform at the general election consisted of universal manhood suffrage and the reform of the House of Peers had to give way to the House whose power it was their mission to curtail. The press was almost unanimous in the condemnation of the Peers for their assertive attitude; but they condemned the government and their supporters equally strongly for their imbecile attitude, and it is quite likely that in less than a year there will again be a political crisis in Japan.

From what I have described, you may have jumped to the conclusion that the days of real democracy are still very distant in Japan. It is certainly true that the constitutional movement that succeeded in overthrowing bureaucracy, which was hailed as a signal triumph for democracy, has met disappointment and humiliation with the qualified victory of the Peers. Cynical critics of the government say that it tried to serve two masters and failed to please either of them. They ask why the government did not resign or dissolve the Diet. They accuse them of a mere desire to remain in office. Nothing is more unjustifiable than this accusation.

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With all due respect to the prime minister, Viscount Kato, it must of course be admitted that he is not a strong man, and it is doubtful whether he is really a democrat at heart. It is, perhaps, nearer the truth to say that he is a staunch conservative at heart. So are at least six others out of the ten ministers who compose the present cabinet. Why, then, did they pledge themselves to universal suffrage and the reform of the upper house? Because, in their opinion, these two measures were the demand of the times and had to be carried out by some ministry. Nothing was easier than either to resign or to dissolve the Diet; but that would have accelerated the coming struggle between the Peers and the populace, and I have reason to believe that some of the ministers thought it their bounden duty to their sovereign and country to alleviate the bitter feeling which a certain section of the people entertain toward the aristocracy by making the two houses arrive at a compromise.

How widespread is that feeling of bitterness and how strong is the desire for universal manhood suffrage it is difficult to ascertain; for, as has already been stated, the present lecturer was the recipient of numerous letters and telegrams when he made his speech urging that the franchise should be restricted to those people who have the vote in

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local self-government, thus reducing the number of voters to about eight million. These letters and telegrams were from merchants, shopkeepers, scholars, soldiers, sailors, gardeners, common laborers—in fact, from all sorts and conditions of men—and were almost unanimous in their assertion that universal suffrage would destroy the family system, which is the pride of Japan, and that it was too early for Japan to follow the example of Europe and America; for, as some of them strongly urged, it is less than sixty years since the feudal system was abolished and thirty-five years since the constitution was granted. They all seemed to fear that the mass of the people are not yet politically conscious.

Whatever may be the feeling of the people concerning the adoption of universal suffrage, and whatever may be its results, one fact is certain, that the three political parties which passed the measure by an overwhelming majority, as well as the one which voted against it, are highly apprehensive of the new force which is sure to come into the political arena, namely, the proletarian class. Already a labor party is in process of formation, and its promoters assert that, at the next general election, by collecting one *yen* each from five million of the proletariat, they can nominate five hundred

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candidates for the Imperial Diet. But, in my opinion, it is only a dream, for the majority of them are very indifferent about politics while quite a large number have misgivings about the adoption of universal suffrage. What shape politics in Japan will assume during the next ten years will be watched with very keen interest. Whether the new franchise will establish popular government or popular misgovernment is a problem as interesting and perplexing for foreigners as Japan's sudden transformation from a feudal state to a constitutional monarchy, on which problem, at the very outset of this lecture, I dwelt very briefly.

From the rough sketch of the political tendencies of modern Japan I now turn to the economic aspects in her recent development.

It is a well-known fact that Japan is a very poor country. St. Francis Xavier wrote in 1549 that there were a great many poor among the Japanese, but that poverty was not a disgrace to anyone. This adage is perhaps the chief cause of our national indigence, although there is another important cause, namely, that the country is very small and has almost no natural resources and that it was introduced into the family of nations only seventy years ago, after most powers had amassed enor-

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mous wealth and appropriated all the available territories of the world.

Japan is still mainly an agricultural country; but even agriculture itself is far from satisfactory, for, the country being very mountainous, less than 14 per cent of its land is arable. Foreigners who have traveled in Japan cannot have failed to notice that even hilltops are cultivated. How to feed a population of fifty-six million, which increases at the rate of more than 1 per cent per annum, with only fourteen million acres of agricultural land, is a problem difficult enough even for the world's ablest statesman to solve. There is no other country in the world which has so small a percentage of land under cultivation. Supposing that all the farms in Japan are put together into one large farm, it can be crossed in a Ford car from one end to the other in about five hours. And from this tiny little space our industrious peasants do their utmost to feed fifty-six million people, and export annually more than three hundred million dollars' worth of raw silk for the ladies of America! It is by sheer hard work and by the use of expensive fertilizers that they produce at present enough rice to save their brothers from starvation. No wonder that the price of rice is very high, being about ten times



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what it was at the time of the Restoration. As the price of this most important staple food is high, wages are high; and as wages are high, the prices of all commodities are high. It is this fact which is creating grave social problems, especially as wages have not risen in proportion to the rise in the price of rice, while the incomes of salaried men have risen only from 25 to 50 per cent. The population of Japan is increasing at the rate of about six hundred thousand a year; and, therefore, in another thirty years, there will be nothing left for us but to starve, unless those countries which have unlimited areas of fertile land grow rice and export it to Japan, or unless, in accordance with the Christian principle of human equality, the open door is declared throughout the world.

Japan's industries are still comparatively young, although they are developing; but how to place them on an even footing with those of the leading European countries and America is another very difficult problem which faces Japan. We grow no cotton; we have only a little coal of inferior quality; we produce only about  $\frac{1}{500}$  per cent of the world's output of oil; we have almost no minerals, with the exception of copper. Thus our factories have to be fed almost entirely from overseas. Therefore, our industries have to depend

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upon our shipping, which during the war, owing to the world's shortage, developed by leaps and bounds, but whose outlook is now most dismal. It is true that in tonnage our country is the fourth in the world, but all the leading steamship companies are in very distressing circumstances. Our ship-building industry is in consequence suffering, the total tonnage of ships launched last year being only about one-tenth of that of 1919.

It is no exaggeration to say that prior to the war with China, Japan's industry was chiefly a household one. The total amount of export in the year hostilities began, namely, in 1894, was less than fifty million dollars, and the total revenue of the state was about one-half of the present revenue of the city of Tokyo. Everything was in its infancy. But our unexpected victory over the sleeping lion China was then thought to be, gave us national consciousness which stimulated the creation of all kinds of factories. Another very unexpected victory, this time over the great Muscovite Empire, gave us a still greater impetus, and by the time the European war broke out the mechanical, chemical, and electrical industries had made great strides, which fact enabled Japan to carry her industrial activities to a state of prosperity unknown even in that little country of wonderful progress.

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Generally speaking, during the war our productive power more than doubled, and we were able to supply the Allies with all kinds of things, including even ships. However, the sudden growth of industries was not an unmixed good, for in their haste to grow richer, the *nouveaux riches* or, as we call them, the *narikin*, often sent out articles which were not up to sample, thus damaging their country's commercial prestige. They are determined to recover their lost reputation and market, and it is a source of satisfaction to learn that shoddy goods are now fast disappearing.

Japan's industry is at present in a state of reaction as an inevitable result of its unnatural expansion. One factory after another had to be either closed or to curtail its output. Several firms and banks have been hit in consequence, and there is a general depression throughout the country except in hydroelectric undertakings, which altogether develop more than one million and five hundred thousand horse-power and which are always very lucrative.

To put it in a nutshell: Japan is now in the midst of economic readjustment, and there is a cry for retrenchment on all sides. The government has done well by reducing expenditures about one hundred and twenty-five million dollars in this

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year's budget, and also by reducing the army by four divisions. These changes, together with those accomplished last year, have cut down the numerical strength of the army by about one-third. But curtailment and retrenchment unfortunately bring much misery in their train, and the numerous army and navy officers, civil officials, company clerks, and workmen find it difficult to secure means of subsistence, and although with regard to the bourgeois class we can still rely upon their loyalty and patriotism, there is no denying the fact that there is a great deal of unrest among the proletarian class. At one time it looked as if this unrest were going to assume very serious proportions. However, the success, taken as a whole, of the late Labour government in Great Britain and the adoption of the Universal Franchise Bill in the last session of the Diet have given them hope, as "Hope springs eternal in the human breast," and there is a movement now among some of the trades unions to expel the extremists.

There is not the slightest doubt, however, that democracy has made much headway, and that the day of bureaucracy is practically over. It is a matter of satisfaction that both the government and capitalists are fully alive to the fact that there is a strong undercurrent of radical thought. They have

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been trying to solve the grave situation by the traditional method of paternal kindness, while the socialists and workmen with uncompromising ideas are determined to obtain the proper recognition of what they consider as their right. There is a strong resentment among them against Article 17 of the Police Regulations Pertaining to Public Safety and Order, under which judges can sentence to major imprisonment of from one to six months those who seduce or incite workmen to strike, and there was a general movement in the press and among the extremists against the Peace Preservation Bill when it was introduced into the Diet last session, and some of the members of the special committee appointed to consider the Bill received threatening letters; but the Bill was passed almost unanimously in both houses.

In order to alleviate the bitter feelings of the extremists and to bring capital and labor into harmonious co-operation with each other, the present lecturer, in the last session of the Diet, interpellated the government if they were prepared to set aside the revenues from death-duties with the object of promoting the welfare of the masses, and was satisfied to receive a reply that the matter would receive the careful consideration of the government.

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I cannot conclude this lecture without dwelling upon the election of General Tanaka as president of the Seiyukai, which is one of the three political parties forming the present coalition ministry. This gallant soldier was at one time a great admirer of Germany, and was thought to be a staunch jingo and the real author of dual diplomacy. Most military and naval men in most countries are unfortunately jingoistic; but General Tanaka is a shrewd statesman and therefore he knows that the day of jingoism is now past and over. I have reason to believe that he will not lead this party to a jingoistic policy but that he has bowed to democracy, and if ever he becomes prime minister (which is quite likely), his foreign policy will be quite different from what he is credited with, namely, the policy indicated by the Twenty-one Demands.

In conclusion, I should like to point out that in the long struggle between bureaucracy and democracy, the time has at last arrived for the latter to triumph, although whether it is to be a popular government or a popular misgovernment remains to be seen; that there is great economic depression, consequent upon undue expansion of industries during the Great War; and that, as a result of this depression and also as a pernicious effect of social unrest and labor troubles throughout the world,



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there is a strong undercurrent of radical thought. But it is the sincere hope and firm conviction of the present lecturer that, as in the past so in the future, the leaders of the country will, by their wisdom and also by their loyalty and patriotism, succeed in piloting the ship of state through the storm.

## II

### JAPAN'S POLICY TOWARD CHINA, SIBERIA, AND KOREA

Nothing has been more welcome to the liberals of Japan and in fact to the whole world than the wonderful change which has taken place in Japan's policy toward China, Siberia, and Korea during the last five years. It was only about six years ago that the present lecturer was obliged to contribute a lengthy article to the *Diplomatic Review*, which is the leading Japanese magazine on diplomatic and international affairs. In this article he felt it his duty strongly to condemn Japan's policy toward China. Perhaps in the course of this lecture I may be allowed to quote two or three passages from a summarized translation which appeared in the *Japan Chronicle*, an influential English paper, unfortunately with anti-Japanese tendencies. The article begins as follows:

The diplomacy of this country since the outbreak of the Great War has been a series of failures and it is now in a state of *impasse*, all because our authorities have lacked insight into the general situation of affairs.

Thus the contributor wrote, because he suspected the existence of an undesirable influence in

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the shaping of Japan's policy toward China and because he was firmly convinced that for the permanent tranquility of the Far East it was essential for Japan to change her China policy. It is therefore a source of gratification, not only to the liberals of Japan, but also to those who at one time had jingoistic tendencies, that Japan's policy toward her colossal neighbor has undergone a complete change. Baron Shidehara, our minister for foreign affairs, in the last session of the Diet made a brilliant speech, in the course of which he said:

We have followed with the strictest exactitude the principle of non-interference in China's internal politics. We have absolutely refrained from supplying any party in China with arms, munitions or loans that might be utilized for the purpose of continuing hostilities. Knowing that the Chinese were sick of war, we believed that the refusal of assistance to any particular party in China was, in effect, assistance rendered to the whole nation of China. Another point to which we attached particular importance was our belief in international good faith. The Japanese government had already subscribed to the resolution of the powers prohibiting the supply of arms and ammunition to China. We further declared on more than one occasion our policy of non-interference in the domestic troubles of that country. We have now translated these commitments faithfully into fact.

So spoke our democratic Foreign Minister, whose one great ambition is to assist China, with-

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out interfering in her domestic affairs, in the regeneration of that great republic.

Baron Shidehara, in the statement I have quoted, has put in a nutshell our policy toward China; but in order to understand how identical our interests are with those of our huge neighbor, it is essential for the students of Oriental problems to go back twenty-five years and look at the political situation in the Far East at the beginning of the present century. Perhaps I may be allowed to go back still farther and look at the critical condition in which the Oriental countries were placed at the time of the advent of Commodore Perry.

After her isolation of more than two hundred years, Japan awoke to see that India was gone—gone as an independent state; that several bits of territory belonging to her great neighbor, China, had been ceded to European powers; that Australia, New Zealand, Java, Sumatra, the Philippines, and, in fact, all the other fertile islands of the Pacific, large and small, were in the hands of European countries; that Siam was in danger of being absorbed; that the northern half of Saghalien and the Kurile Islands, which were really portions of the Japanese Empire, had been seized by Russia; that the British fleet had seized a Korean island as a coaling station; that the Muscovite Empire had

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expanded from Europe to the very door of Japan; that the British Empire covered every part of the globe; and that a scramble for Africa was about to begin. She soon found out also that even Commodore Perry, who had come out on a peaceful and friendly mission, had his eyes on the Bonin and Loochoo Islands, not certainly for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement, but with the object of preventing Russia from snatching them from the hands of Japan. With a similar object in view, Great Britain had her eyes on the islands of Tsushima, which are within a stone's throw of the main island. If Commodore Perry's mission had been delayed a few years, Japan would, in all probability, have awakened to find several of her islands gone. It is this fact which at one time endeared to the hearts of the Japanese the memory of Perry, and the American people—a feeling of gratitude which is unfortunately gone for the time being, for the Japanese are a very susceptible people and deeply feel the recent exclusion law, which some of them consider as a studied insult on the part of the leaders of the anti-Japanese agitation.

From what I have described, it is clear that the interests of China and Japan have been in the main identical; but the statesmen of the two countries have always acted in a way which has produced

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exactly opposite results. Before the Chino-Japanese War, the "Celestial Empire," as the Chinese were then proud to call their own country, treated Japan with contempt, and in all her diplomatic negotiations with us her attitude was most high-handed. Japan, on the other hand, looked down upon China as a corrupt and monstrous anachronism, destined humbly to accept European domination unless she was determined to reform. Besides, there was a great common danger approaching, which Japan had the foresight to fear, but which China refused or failed to see, namely, the advance of Russia toward Manchuria and Korea. China had always claimed Korea as her dependency, but the peninsular kingdom was even more corrupt and rotten than her protector, and there was the danger of her finally passing, by Russia's skilful diplomacy and intrigues, into the hands of that country. In order to prevent this, it was essential to make Korea an independent state and reform her administration. It was China's stubborn refusal to see the danger ahead and Japan's fear of the imminence of the menace to her very existence that really caused the war between these two countries.

How justified Japan was in her fear is proved by the fact that six days after the signing of the



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treaty of peace between the belligerent countries, Russia, Germany, and France forced Japan to renounce the most important fruit of her victory over China, namely, the Liaontung peninsula. Three years after the retrocession by Japan of this legitimate fruit of the war with China, in the guise of a leasehold, Russia took possession of the peninsula which she had forced Japan to evacuate, while Germany had already established herself in Kiaochow in the province of Shantung. France now came in and extorted from the powerless empire of China a concession for the occupation of Kuang-Chow, Great Britain soon followed their example by obtaining a lease of Wei-hai-wei.

These foreign encroachments on the integrity of China were the cause of an outbreak against foreigners, which is known as the Boxer Rising. Counseled by all the powers except Russia, Japan dispatched a strong force, and the foreign legations and residents in Peking were saved. True to her traditions, making the unfortunate rising a pretext, Russia dispatched a large force to Manchuria, and was soon in virtual possession of that huge and fertile province. Not content with the military occupation of this large territory, she soon began to cast her covetous eyes on Korea and carried on all kinds of intrigues at the court of the peninsular

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kingdom. At the same time she sent large bodies of soldiers, disguised as civilians, into Korea in order to consummate her aggressive designs. It was now a question of life or death for Japan, and the government of Tokyo approached the government of the Czar with the object of preventing further encroachment by Russia on the sovereignty of Korea. The Muscovite government simply dragged on the negotiations, in the meantime pouring large bodies of troops into Manchuria and dispatching battle-ships and cruisers to Port Arthur. It was in order to safeguard her own independence that Japan finally and reluctantly decided to take up arms against her colossal foe.

After the battle of Mukden, in which the Russian Army was crushed, and the naval battle of the Japan Sea, by which the Russian Baltic fleet was annihilated, President Roosevelt invited the belligerent countries to open peace negotiations at Portsmouth. The events which led up to the conclusion of the peace treaty, its terms, and the subsequent happenings are still fresh in everybody's mind.

Having fought against frightful odds with the colossal empire of Russia and having finally defeated her, Japan now felt that she could pursue her peaceful aims of giving assistance to China and

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Korea for their regeneration. But, as I have said already in connection with America's exclusion policy, the Japanese as a nation are highly susceptible, and easily take offense. They knew that it was the moral and material assistance of Great Britain that enabled their country to bring Russia to her knees, and therefore the whole nation felt very grateful to her loyal ally. Thus, when the violation of Belgian neutrality dragged Great Britain into the European war, the Japanese were almost united in their desire that their country should go promptly to her assistance.

Although I know no diplomatic secrets, I have reason to believe that at first our offer of services was not very heartily welcomed by our ally, and that when the increasing activity of the German men-of-war in the Eastern waters finally induced them to approach us, inviting us to clear the China seas of the enemy, we were asked to restrict our activity within certain spheres and not to go beyond a certain latitude. This fact and the firm conviction that we were the sole guarantors of China's integrity against foreign aggression, coupled with the fact that all the Great Powers of Europe were then engaged in a life-and-death struggle, unfortunately persuaded our government to assume a defiant attitude, contrary to our tradi-

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tional courtesy in international dealings, and to present to our friendly neighbor what are known as the Twenty-one Demands. While admitting that many of the attacks made upon this policy of Japan are justifiable, it should be said in fairness that she was simply walking in the footsteps of the Great Powers of Europe.

Of the Twenty-one Demands, there remain now only two articles of importance, namely, those concerning the extension of the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and of the terms of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway and the right of Japanese subjects to lease land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for pursuing agricultural enterprises.

How we conceded point after point to China at the Washington Conference until there remain practically only the two articles just mentioned, all the world knows. But, unfortunately, China has been asserting ever since that even those two articles must be abrogated, on the plea that the whole treaty was signed under duress. It should, however, be remembered by students of international affairs, especially of Oriental problems, that Port Arthur and Dalny—in fact, the entire peninsula of Liaotung—had been ceded to Japan by

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China by the treaty of Shimonoseki, as a legitimate fruit of our victory, but that Russia, France, and Germany, at the point of the sword, forced us to relinquish it. It should also be noted that three years later Russia leased it from China by coercion. If the Chino-Japanese treaties of 1915 should be abrogated because they were not negotiated willingly, then it follows that the retrocession of the Liaotung peninsula by Japan should also be declared void, and instead of being a leased territory it should become a permanent portion of the Japanese Empire, for the retrocession was forced upon Japan by the three Great Powers of Europe. It logically follows, then, that Great Britain must return Hongkong, and several other international agreements will have to be abrogated for similar reasons. Your Senator Robinson, of Arkansas, spoke truly when he said, on July 24, 1919, as follows:

Every commercial treaty of importance now in force between China and European nations is the result of war or some other form of duress.

In view of the fact that the commercial relations of nearly all nations with China are based on duress in some form, and in contemplation of the further fact that the most important treaties now in force between the various nations are the outcome of wars—which, of course, are the supreme manifestations of duress—why then should the claim that China was

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induced to make the treaty with Japan through fear of war invalidate that treaty, and all other treaties with China, many of which she was compelled by war to execute, be left in force?

If we go back into history and invalidate every treaty into which duress has entered chaos in international relations will result.

Continuing, this impartial observer says:

Shall we assert that treaties tainted with duress in which Japan is interested must be invalidated and at the same time recognise English, French, and Russian compacts with the Chinese government—compacts, for the most part, extorted through war engaged in for the express purpose of compelling China to yield? Shall we attempt to make one rule for Japan and a totally different rule for other nations? To ask the question is to answer it.

Because I have quoted at some length from Senator Robinson's speech, it must not be assumed that I am defending a jingoistic policy. In an article which I contributed to the *Diplomatic Review* three months before the Washington Conference was opened, I used these words: "In the eyes of God strong nations are often defendants on the suit of weak ones."

From Japan's past policy toward China I now turn to her present policy, which, as stated by our Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Imperial Diet, is one of non-interference in the domestic affairs of China and of merely safeguarding our rightful posi-



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tion, and, in particular, our rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia. As he emphasized in his speech, our concern is not confined to the condition of affairs in these two provinces only. We are certainly interested in the whole of China to such an extent and degree as conditions there are essential to our national existence. Baron Shidehara in his speech referred to above went on to say:

Japan, in self-defence and in the interest of peace in the Far East, staked the country's fortunes on two great wars in the Manchurian plains. By such supreme efforts, we are now enabled to engage in peaceful undertakings in that region. I desire to repeat here once more what has been so often declared by the Japanese government, that we have no territorial designs of any kind in that or any other part of China.

Then he proceeded to dwell upon the principle of non-interference which I have quoted at the beginning of the present lecture, and concluded as follows:

What has been the result of this attitude? I am happy to believe that the sense of justice and fairness with which we have met the situation is now widely appreciated not only by the Chinese people, but by all the powers of the world, with a consequent marked improvement in our relations with China and increased mutual confidence between us and the other powers.

With the assumption of the office of Provisional Executive by Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, we have, on consultation with the Powers, recognized his government as the *de facto* government

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of China. We are not directly interested in the question, who will assume the reins of government in China, or what constitutional system may be adopted in that country. With a long historical background and amidst the surroundings peculiar to the country, the Chinese people must be left free to order their own national life in their own way. All that we consider important is that China should be provided with a sufficiently strong government to fulfil her international obligations in good faith and to maintain peace and order within her borders.

Believing that the provisional government of China is seriously striving to attain these objects, we pray with deep sympathy for its success, and we are further prepared to render to China, in common with the other powers, such friendly assistance as may lie in our power. It should, however, be clearly understood that such sympathy and assistance are extended, not so much to any particular person or any particular party in China, as to the whole nation of China whose greater good we have always at heart.

It is undoubtedly a tremendous undertaking to establish peace and unity in China. Although that work has not so far made such progress as might be desired, it must not be concluded that the Chinese people are not fully endowed with the gift of character needed for self-government. Such inference seems to us entirely unwarranted. In no case can we accept any plan based on these mistaken premises to place Chinese railways and other administrative organs under international control. We are satisfied that no such project is under contemplation by any foreign government.

The reports that China may possibly become a communist state, or that she contemplates repudiation of all inter-

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national commitments which she may deem prejudicial to herself, do not seem to us to be worthy of credence. We shall watch, with hope and tolerance, the efforts of the Chinese people to carry out political reforms so much needed for the country. While fully asserting our legitimate rights and interests in China, we shall give due and sympathetic consideration to the special conditions under which she is labouring, and we shall direct our best attention to the promotion of mutual understanding and co-operation—spiritual, cultural, and economic—between the two nations.

From our policy toward China let us now pass to our policy toward Siberia. Here again we must survey for a few moments our past policy, which was in reality forced upon us.

It was at the invitation of the Allied Powers that Japan decided to send an expedition to Siberia. The Diplomatic Advisory Board was not unanimous in giving its approval, nor was the cabinet undivided in its decision. The expedition was undertaken in common accord and in co-operation with the United States in order to render assistance to the Czecho-Slovak troops who, in their homeward journey across Siberia from European Russia, found themselves in grave and pressing danger at the hands of hostile forces under German command.

In January, 1920, the United States withdrew its forces, leaving our troops to carry out alone the

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unpleasant and ungrateful task of guarding several points along the Trans-Siberian Railway in fulfilment of interallied arrangements, and of giving facilities to the stranded Czecho-Slovaks. Japan could not withdraw troops as easily as America for very obvious reasons, for she had thousands of her people settled and doing business in Siberia, and the fact that we had dispatched troops had so antagonized the bolsheviki that their withdrawal would have created a very dangerous situation for the Japanese residents.

There are indeed only a few instances in the history of the world of such a tragedy as that in which more than seven hundred Japanese, including women and children as well as the Japanese Consul and his family and his official staff, were brutally murdered, after having been most cruelly tortured. This one fact would have supplied a *casus belli* for any nation. It was the burning of a number of cases containing opium which was the cause of what is known as the Opium War, after which China had to cede Hongkong to Great Britain. It was the blowing up of the battleship "Maine" of Havana by the disintegration of gunpowder, as has since been proved, which became the cause of the war, as a result of which Spain had to part with the Philippines. When we consider

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these two cases and several other causes of wars which are too numerous to mention, the United States and the other powers can easily appreciate the forbearance in our dealings with Russia.

In fact, three years before the conclusion of the treaty restoring the relations between the two countries, we had withdrawn all our troops from the mainland, leaving only a battalion or so in the island of Saghalien. As I have stated at the beginning of the lecture, the island as well as the group of small islands known as the Kuriles formerly belonged to Japan, but Russia snatched from us the northern half of the island and the Kuriles. In 1876, the father of the present lecturer, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs, had extracted a promise from the Russian government to restore them to Japan on receipt of one million dollars. The Foreign Minister was encouraged in this deal by his American adviser, Le Gendre, who suggested to his chief to get back the island by purchase, as the United States had bought Alaska from Russia for four million dollars. Unfortunately, the late Count Kuroda, who was then governor of Kokkaido—a large Japanese island which almost touches Saghalien—sent a memorial to the government urging them to relinquish our claim to the island—advice which was most unfortunately ac-

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cepted by the government, and this was one of the causes of the Foreign Minister's resignation shortly afterward.

Fifty years ago we could have had the island of Saghalien restored to us for one million dollars. Two years ago, when at the Tokyo conference our delegate approached Mr. Joffe, the Russian delegate, for a price, I understand he mentioned the modest sum of \$750,000,000, or seven hundred and fifty times as much as a half-century ago.

I have been asked to say something about our policy toward Siberia, because I presume that there are Americans who think that, as Japan is thickly populated and as Siberia is a fertile plain large enough to sustain a population several times that of Japan, we must have some sinister designs in that part of the Asiatic continent. Nothing is farther from the truth. The following are some of the more important points in the treaty recently concluded by Japan with Russia, which will show how lenient we have been toward our much distressed neighbor:

### ARTICLE II

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905, shall remain in full force.

It is agreed that the Treaties, Conventions and Agree-



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ments, other than the said Treaty of Portsmouth, which were concluded between Japan and Russia prior to November 7, 1917, shall be re-examined at a Conference to be subsequently held between the Governments of the High Contracting Parties and are liable to revision or annulment as altered circumstances may require.

### ARTICLE III

The Governments of the High Contracting Parties agree that upon the coming into force of the present Convention, they shall proceed to the revision of the Fishery Convention of 1907, taking into consideration such changes as may have taken place in the general conditions since the conclusion of the said Fishery Convention.

Pending the conclusion of a convention so revised, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall maintain the practices established in 1924 relating to the lease of fishery lots to Japanese subjects.

In concluding these brief remarks on the Japanese policy toward Siberia, let me quote a passage from Baron Shidehara's speech in the Diet. The Foreign Secretary says:

Let us now turn to the Russian problem. As I stated here in the last session, we fully realize that Russia and Japan, having common interests in many respects, are bound to maintain relations of amity and friendship. There have been, however, between them many important questions calling for solution, and involving in some cases difficulties of serious nature. If, therefore, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations were not preceded by the adjustment of these pending

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questions, it is certain that there would immediately follow unpleasant disputes, compromising the future relations of the two nations. Nothing is farther from our thought than the idea of bargaining away recognition of the Soviet Government, in return for oil or coal concessions. We have only tried to forestall and eliminate sources of future trouble, in the belief that the restoration of Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations should be effected in a generally congenial atmosphere. This is the reason why so much time has already been taken in the negotiations. These negotiations finally came to a successful close and a Basic Convention and supplementary documents were duly signed on the night of January 20.

The long outstanding questions have thus been satisfactorily adjusted, and upon the exchange of ratifications of the pacts just signed, friendly relations between the two countries are to be formally reopened. It is with sincere gratification that I am now able to announce this happy issue of the Russo-Japanese Conference at Peking.

Let me now say a few words about our policy in Korea, which has been the cause of two great wars.

The late Marquis Curzon, of Kedleston, at one time viceroy of India, and during the European war secretary of state for foreign affairs, and at the time of his death lord president of the Privy Council, in his well-known book called *Problems of the Far East*, which he wrote when he was still called "the Honorable" George Curzon and as far back as the year 1894, said:

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The spectacle of a country possessing an historical antiquity, contemporaneous, as alleged, with that of Thebes and Babylon, but owning no ruins; boasting of a separate, if not an independent, national existence for centuries, and yet devoid of all external symptoms of strength; retaining latest of all the kingdoms of the East the title to successful exclusion of the foreigner, and yet animated by no real hostility to aliens; containing beautiful natural scenery still virgin to the traveller's foot; claiming to have given Japan her letters, her science, her religion, and her art, and yet bereft of almost all vestiges of these herself; inhabited by a people of physical vigour but moral inertness; well endowed with resources, yet crippled for want of funds—such a spectacle is one to which I know of no counterpart even in Asia, the continent of contrasts, and which from a distance had long and powerfully affected my imagination. A bridge between China and Japan, Korea is nevertheless profoundly unlike either. It has lacked the virile training of the Feudal System in Japan, and the incentives to industry supplied by the crowded existence of China. Its indifference to religion has left it without the splendid temples that adorn the former country, without the stubborn self-sufficiency of character developed by Confucianism in the latter.

In a chapter called "The Destinies of the Far East," that farsighted statesman wrote:

That that petty kingdom cannot expect for long to retain any real independence, the description which I have given will have shown. A palace intrigue, the death of a king or a queen, an internal rebellion, may at any moment produce an émeute or imbroglio, such as has already invited outside interference, and can only end in a diminution or abrogation of the national claims to autonomy. The friends of Korea do wrong-

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ly, in my opinion in encouraging the latter pretensions. A country that is too weak to stand alone gains nothing by an affected indifference to external support.

So wrote, thirty years ago, that young traveler who became one of the world's most eminent statesmen. How true were his words have been proved by subsequent events, and the seventeen million people who inhabit the peninsula of Korea now enjoy perfect security of life and property—a thing which they could not even dream of in the days of their independence.

It is fifteen years since Japan and Korea were amalgamated, with the object, as stated in the treaty of amalgamation, of “promoting the common weal of the two nations and of assuring permanent peace in the Extreme East.” Since then a wonderful transformation has taken place, and the general culture and welfare of the people have been much advanced. Unfortunately, however, in March, 1919, disturbances broke out in several places, their chief causes having been the unpopularity of Governor-General Count Hasegawa and President Wilson's doctrine of self-determination of nations. It is a matter sincerely to be regretted that the agitation was first started by influential Christians as well as by believers of the Tendokyo, which is a new Korean religion. The majority of

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the populace hardly knew what the disturbances were all about, but at one time the situation became very serious. Fortunately, however, the majority of the Koreans of the upper and middle classes were too prudent to take part in the movement. They not only refused all inducements and threats to join the agitation, but many of them were bold enough to visit various places and, at the risk of their own lives, to use their restraining influence against rioting. The turbulent period lasted sixty days, during which six hundred and eighteen places were affected, the number of rioters being over a half-million.

Every cloud has a silver lining, and although the movement itself was most deplorable, the militaristic Governor-General was soon forced to resign and was succeeded by one of the most humane and human statesmen of modern times—Baron Saito. I have been told by a number of Japanese, foreigners, and Koreans that there are many Korean malcontents who are quite anxious to see the Governor-General but who are afraid of doing so, for they hear that once they have a talk with him there is the danger of losing the anti-Japanese spirit and becoming pro-Japanese, so kindhearted and attractive is their administrator, whose one ambition is to do his utmost for advanc-

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ing the welfare of the Korean people. On the day of his arrival in the capital of Korea as governor-general a bomb was thrown at him, and although he escaped unhurt, several people who had assembled to welcome him were killed or wounded. He was fired at several times during his trips on the frontier, but he does not care, for he is fearless. If he ever falls at the hands of a Korean, which God forbid, I know that his dying words will be "Forgive him." With such a governor-general administering the affairs of the peninsula, the happiness of the people is assured.

I shall now describe briefly what reforms have already been accomplished in Korea and what will be its future. I shall not attempt to describe the reforms effected in the administration prior to the appointment of the present Governor-General, for great as they were they fall into insignificance when compared with the titanic changes made since 1919. Briefly stated, the main points are as follows:

1. Replacement of the former military government with a civil government, making the governor-generalship open to a civil official
2. Replacement of the gendarmerie system with an ordinary police system
3. Establishment of non-discrimination between Japanese and Koreans
4. Establishment of a cultural policy with a view to raising the Korean people to the same standard as the Japanese



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The spirit of the new policy is indicated by the Imperial Rescript which was promulgated in August, 1919, and which reads as follows:

We have ever made it Our aim to promote the security and welfare of Our territory of Korea, and to extend to the native population of that territory as Our beloved subjects a fair and impartial treatment in all respects, to the end that they may without distinction of persons lead their lives in peace and contentment. We are persuaded that the state of development at which the general situation has now arrived calls for certain reforms in the administrative organization of the Government-General of Korea, and We issue Our Imperial command that such reforms be put into operation. The measures thus taken are solely designed to facilitate the working of the administration and to secure good and enlightened government in pursuance of Our settled policy, and in fulfilment of the altered requirements of the country. Specially in view of the termination of the war in Europe and of the rapid changes in the conditions of the world do We consider it highly desirable that every effort should be made for the advancement of the national resources and the well-being of the people. We call upon all public functionaries concerned to exercise their best endeavours in obedience to Our wishes in order that a benign rule may be assured to Korea, and that the people, diligent and happy in attending to their respective vocations, may enjoy the blessing of peace and contribute to the growing prosperity of the country.

The first work of the present Governor-General as soon as he assumed the reins of government was to invite influential and leading men from all the

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provinces to assemble in the capital with the object of coming to a real understanding with them and of hearing their unreserved opinions on the administration. A few months later he dispatched several leading secretaries to the provinces with instructions to meet prominent Koreans, including elders and learned men, and thus to become acquainted with their views and opinions on the administration.

As officials, Koreans are now equally eligible with Japanese for any rank or decorations, and there are now five Koreans among the thirteen provincial governors, and the present lecturer is of the opinion that in ten years or so there will probably be a Korean deputy governor-general. Perhaps it will interest you to hear that the Universal Suffrage Law which was passed in the last session of the Imperial Diet grants the franchise alike to Japanese and Koreans who have the residential qualification of one year or more. Thus if the seventeen million Koreans come and settle in Japan—and the law grants them that right—they will become, not only a great political influence, but a deciding factor in the administration of the empire of Japan.

I must not conclude this lecture before I tell you something about the many interesting talks I have

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had with some of the leaders of the Korean independence movement and about the future of the peninsula. Although I have traveled a great deal, I am almost ashamed to say that it was only the year before last that I went to Korea for the first time. And I would probably have never gone there, had I not heard, at a meeting held in Tokyo, a lecture on Korea, in which the lecturer said that another independence movement was in sight and that ominous clouds were gradually looming on the horizon.

When I arrived in the capital, some of the high officials of the Government-General asked me what my program was—if I wanted to be presented to the former Emperor of Korea and the leading Korean noblemen. In reply I said that I had come in order to exchange views with some of the anti-Japanese American missionaries and Korean malcontents. My reply naturally shocked the officials, but they did not prevent me from seeing them. On the contrary, they gave me every facility. With regard to the interviews I had with the American missionaries I will tell you this much—they are not really anti-Japanese at heart. They spoke their minds and I spoke mine, and we were finally agreed that the policy of the present administration is liberal and enlightened. With regard to the many

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interesting talks I had with some of the leaders of the independence movement, some of whom had been liberated from prison only two years previously, I will tell you somewhat more at length. They were almost unanimous in their desire to have back their independence. I said to them that during the many centuries they were nominally independent they had no security of life and property. They had almost fallen into the abyss of national ruin. Their hills had been denuded of all the trees, with the result that in the dry season the rivers were almost dry and in the rainy season they were destructive. They were kept ignorant because it paid their rulers to make them ignorant. Quoting from a well-known American author, I said:

In the days of your independence gross abuse existed—a veritable sink of misgovernment, corruption, filth, and misery. As the Japanese are not angels but fallible human beings, it is not surprising that the best of them have made mistakes, and that the worst have committed crimes. It was equally inevitable that some of the best of the Koreans should feel their national pride wounded by the domination of an alien government; that corrupt officials and indolent peasants should resent the reforms that had to be forced upon them; that some misguided men should resort to violent methods against their new rulers; and that subordinate [Japanese] officials should not always be considerate and humane in carrying out their task.

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After having quoted these words, I said to them that it was doubtful whether it was a wise thing for Japan to have annexed Korea, but that it was as clear as daylight that it was a wise thing for Korea to have amalgamated with Japan. For, I told them, if Japan had not annexed Korea, Russia would have done so. "Look," I said, "at the present condition of Russia. Imagine Korea to be under the tutelage of Lenin, Trotsky, Zinovieff, Stalin, Kameneff, and gentry of that sort!" Then I said to them that, first of all, the system of universal compulsory education must be adopted in Korea, and that when the people have become politically conscious a liberal measure of self-government should be granted. "In my opinion," I continued, "that would be the best thing for Japan as well as for Korea." And I felt quite honored when I saw, on the day of my departure for home shortly before the great earthquake, a number of the leaders of the independence movement standing on the platform together with Japanese officials and others and also two or three so-called anti-Japanese American missionaries, and some of the first inquiries I received soon after the earthquake came from these Koreans. They are also human and very likable people.

May it, therefore, be our good fortune, with the

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good will and, if possible, the moral support of the powers interested in the affairs of the Far East, especially of America, to lead the Koreans to that destination which, I hope, they will reach in less than twenty years and where, I trust, they will be able to govern themselves under the guidance and as an integral part of the Empire of the Rising Sun.





### III

## JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

In opening this lecture, perhaps I may be permitted to quote a few passages from a lengthy article I contributed to the *Japanese Diplomatic Review* in 1920, summarized translations of which appeared in the *Japan Chronicle* and the *Japan Advertiser*. It is from these condensed translations that I shall quote.

In this article, after having dwelt at length upon the causes of estrangement between Britain and Japan, which I attributed chiefly to our mistaken policy toward China during the world-war, I proceeded as follows:

“It is nearly for the same causes that the relations between America and Japan are not so satisfactory as could be desired, but it seems that half the blame rests with America. Having forced Japan to open the country to foreign intercourse, America was comparatively friendly to Japan up to the time of the Russo-Japanese War, during which her people subscribed to Japanese war bonds and the American press was also highly sympathetic

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with Japan. It is, however, regrettable that there has been a marked change in the feelings of the Americans toward this nation since the Peace of Portsmouth. But it seems to me that unfortunately there are some Americans who are very wilful and headstrong in their disposition toward foreigners. Personally I like the Anglo-Saxons very much. I have a great love for the British nation, and I also attach high value to the friendship of the Americans. Speaking frankly, however, the Anglo-Saxons are too proud. This is particularly the case with the Americans. At the same time, they are an interesting nation, simple-minded and sincere, and firm and constant. When they come to a full understanding, I do not think that it will be difficult for the three powers of Japan, Britain, and America to co-operate permanently to safeguard the peace of the world. As for the Californian problem, it implies a question of labour as well as economic and racial questions, but one of its chief causes is the sense of suspicion and hatred entertained against Japan. In order to remove this, it is imperative to change Japan's China policy, nay, the whole of her Asiatic policy. This brings me to a discussion of the China policy of America.

“Originally America acted on the Monroe Doctrine, interdicting foreign powers from inter-

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ference with the American continent, while she herself refrained from interfering with foreign powers. Without any rhyme or reason, however, she annexed Hawaii and also proceeded to meddle with the colonial policy of Spain, whom she fought and from whom she wrested the Philippines, and ended by acquiring great power in Asia. Up to that point, she was not actuated by any conscious world-policy and her development was not deliberate. But when she became conscious of her being a great power in Asia, she awoke to the fact that, compared to Britain and Japan, her influence, both commercial and political, in China was very slight. Twenty years ago, Dr. Reinsch, then a professor at Wisconsin University and afterward American minister to China, wrote that China was to be conquered by means of railways. That time is now past. It is by education that America is now conquering China. Not content with receiving kindly Chinese students to America, the Americans have established influential universities in Peking, Nanking, Shanghai, etc., which boast many thousand students in the aggregate. Unfortunately, anti-Japanese sentiments are prevalent in these seats of learning.

“In some extreme cases, anti-Japanese ideas are strongly emphasized even in the magazines

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published by the students. One of these organs actually contained a poem in praise of the assassin of the late Prince Ito and it was asserted that Japan was the concocter of civil war in China. On my entering a protest with the president of the university concerned, he regretted that offence had been given to the Japanese by the too great liberty of speech given the students. At the same time he pointed out that for some years past a certain clique in Japan had governed Japanese diplomacy and thereby incurred the ill will of the Chinese, that Japan had let slip a great opportunity for guiding China, that if Japan had acted on a sound policy after her war with China she would have gained great influence there, but that as her policy had been always selfish she had aroused the enmity of her neighbour. He added that it was not yet too late to mend, and that though China also had many faults Japan would forfeit the sympathy of the world if she persisted in the policy she had so far pursued toward China.

“The remarks of the president were quite right. I want the nation to put down our militarist diplomacy by all means and recover the credit and reputation of the state. In the meantime, America is conquering China by education. Less than twenty years hence almost all the Chinese occupy-

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ing important posts in the state will be men educated either in America or in Chinese universities under American management. The result of all this is not difficult to imagine. While the Japanese government and people are eagerly running after trivial gains of the moment, the Americans are steadily pursuing a grand policy which will bear fruit in a more remote future. When they come to govern China peacefully with their boundless wealth and their wonderful energy, what will its effect be on Japan? In short, unless Japan gives up her mistaken militarist policy and amends her attitude toward China agreeably to the general tendency of the world, she will have to repent when too late and bequeath troubles to after generations."

After having trounced most severely the jingoes of my own country, I concluded the article as follows:

"But militarism still reigns not only in the five Great Powers but even in Communist Russia. The policy of Britain, France, and Italy toward Greece is of the same type as the pro-Tuan policy of the Terauchi ministry of Japan. Their operations in Constantinople are similar in nature to those of Japan in Vladivostok. When I was in America in 1919, an influential American said to me that the



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naval extension of America was for the maintenance of the peace on the two oceans agreeably to the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations. I replied, 'But in that way armament competition among nations will never cease.' For my part, however, I have no doubt whatever that the Americans, who have a great regard for peace, justice, and humanity, will act faithfully on high principles. At the same time, I should like those praiseworthy Americans employed in mission and educational work in China always to bear in mind the following words of the Saviour Jesus Christ:

Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you always even unto the end of the World [Matt. 28: 19-20].

"At present, there are no nations on earth who are less inclined to war than Britain and Japan. The Japanese know that their country is poor and she is no match (for America) in a war of wealth and science. In Britain war is regarded as a crime by the majority of the nation. At least, it is known by all the world that British workers will never allow Britain to go to war again. Such being the case, the large-scale extension of armaments by America would seem entirely senseless."

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In another lengthy article, which I wrote in the same magazine two months later and which was translated by the same English papers almost *in toto*, I began as follows:

“In this article, I will discuss the distant and proximate causes of the naval competition which has unfortunately arisen between Japan and America, refer to the menace offered to the peace of the world by the arbitrary proceedings and reckless and extravagant habit of the United States, trace how the very unwise diplomacy pursued by the Japanese Foreign Office has aggravated American suspicions against this country, suggest a way for sweeping away the misunderstandings now existing between Japan and America, and end by appealing to the common sense of the two nations and giving a warning to them that in case the problems between the two countries are not amicably settled and war breaks out between them, the world will again be plunged into an irretrievable chaos and confusion, bolshevik ideas will spread everywhere, and civilization itself may be brought to a termination, no matter which side achieves a final victory.”

Proceeding, I said that in my opinion nothing was more significant and grave than the change in America's diplomacy during the last twenty-five

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years. Peaceful America, who had faithfully adhered to the Monroe Doctrine, waged war with Spain and by annexing the Philippines became a great power in Asia. It was about this time that the government of Hawaii, which was then still an independent country, refused the landing of a large number of Japanese immigrants. Thereupon the Japanese government entered a strong protest, which was quite justified; but, unfortunately, to back it up, a cruiser was dispatched to Hawaii, where she stayed for six months at great expense. The foreign minister at that time was Count Okuma, who was afterward raised to the rank of marquis and whose name became famous twenty years later in connection with the Twenty-one Demands on China. The only result of this protest and expedition was an indemnity of seventy-five thousand dollars and tons of barnacles on the cruiser's hull. While the negotiations were going on, America finally annexed the islands, upon which she had been casting a covetous eye for some time past. The stupid steps taken by the Japanese government only accelerated the execution of the American design of absorption.

It was soon evident that the occupation of the Philippines and Hawaii was making the naval ex-

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pansion of America appear more necessary than ever; but the mere acquisition of oversea possessions was not a sufficient argument, so there was started a vigorous propaganda on the part of ship-builders, and the possibility of war between the two countries of traditional friendship was preached by American jingoes. Unfortunately, just at this delicate moment the Californian problems became more and more complicated, culminating in the famous school question, and a certain well-known Japanese statesman with jingoistic tendencies gave vent to a very irresponsible utterance amounting to almost a threat of war with America. A certain section of the American press, well known for its yellow character, was not slow to seize the opportunity for urging naval expansion and the fortification of the Philippines and Hawaii. The result, as is well known, was the tour of inspection in the Far East of Mr. Taft, who was then secretary of war in the Roosevelt administration, and the cruise around the world of the American fleet. At that time the military party in Japan was at the height of its power, and, therefore, the island empire, strongly entrenched in Manchuria as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, was looked upon as another Muscovite Empire, cloaked in the guise of

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the protector of China and Korea. There is no denying the fact that even President Roosevelt, who was a sincere admirer and a real friend of Japan, was determined to check what his government thought Japan's undue expansion. The American Navy, which had been diligently expanded with this object, was more powerful than that of Japan when the world-war broke out, being then almost second to none, except Great Britain, in strength and efficiency.

Most unfortunately, just at the time when the relations between Japan and America were becoming very strained, owing to mutual suspicions and misunderstandings, the Japanese government committed a serious blunder. Instead of waiting, as America did, until a more opportune moment to join in the war, in their haste to assist Great Britain, especially as the nation was then unanimous in her desire to do so, they took a wrong course. Instead of declaring war on Germany in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan sent a cynical ultimatum to Germany, couched in similar terms to the "friendly advice" of the triple intervention, which robbed her of the most important of the legitimate fruits of her victory over China. Under the circumstances it was not to be wondered at that many

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Americans believed that Japan had decided to participate in the war in order to satisfy her territorial ambitions.

Not only was the manner in which Japan joined in the war conducive to misunderstanding, but it was considered most offensive by Americans of German origin. Then came the Twenty-one Demands, of which, as I have said in a previous lecture, there remain only two articles of importance and a bad name. Before the presentation of these demands, Japan's faithful adherence to international engagements and her comity toward all nations had never been questioned; but her mismanagement of the negotiations, which shrewd diplomats would have settled at a dinner table, has unfortunately left a blemish in her diplomatic history. Later came two more blunders, namely, the loan of money to the Yuan ministry of China in 1916-17 and the acceptance of the invitation of America and the other Allies to send an expedition into Siberia.

Since the outbreak of the Great War, a preparedness campaign has been started in America on a very extensive scale, urging that the nation must be prepared for all emergencies. If I remember rightly, no less a person than General Wood, the present governor of the Philippines, in an



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article contributed to a book containing several interesting and instructive articles, went to the length of proclaiming that the United States should be prepared to mobilize at any time five hundred thousand officers and ten million men. This preparedness campaign was, of course, directed against the menace of German aggression. But, as the "war to end war" fortunately ended in the victory of the Allies (thanks to the entry of the United States!) there was apparently no need for a further campaign. Yet the United States, who had the glorious honor of having won the war, decided to adhere to the 1916 program of naval expansion.

Mr. Daniels, the naval secretary, said in Paris on March 26, 1919, that though America was intent upon having the strongest navy in the world, she had no designs against Britain's suzerainty at sea. In July of the same year he said to me at Washington, if I remember rightly, that she had no intention of robbing Great Britain of the scepter of the sea, but that it was her duty to keep the freedom of the seas. From an American viewpoint, perhaps this was America's navy policy put in a nutshell. If America considered it her duty to insure the freedom of the seas and check the alleged aggressive designs of Japan on the Pacific, she was

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certainly justified in doing so. The British people are tactful and shrewd and are well known for their common sense, and their Empire being the strongest power in the world, they could afford to watch quite calmly the American naval expansion. But could Japan look on equally calmly? Unfortunately, she could not; for, although there was no cause of war behind the two English-speaking peoples, between America and Japan there were more than two possible causes. At least, such was the view entertained by many people on both sides of the Pacific.

Dwelling upon the possible causes of war between America and Japan, in my article of 1920 I said:

“In my opinion, the Californian issue is, after all, a Californian issue—it cannot be a cause of war between the two nations. In other states, Japanese are comparatively favourably treated. In California, too, there is no reason why the Japanese immigrants should be subjected to so much opposition and persecution. Even according to the report of the committee for the investigation into the conditions of Japanese immigrants, composed exclusively of American citizens, ‘They are well educated, they are eager to learn English, they have a high standard of personal cleanliness, they

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are generous in their relations with others and they are generally temperate.' In fact, the Californians are benighted, deficient in the sense of justice and impervious to reason, but while Japan has the absolute right to protest against their benightedness, their injustice, and their unreasonableness, and it is further necessary that she should resolutely assert and enforce this her right, it would be absurd for Japan to stake her national fortunes on a local issue like this.

"While a possible cause of war between Japan and America exists on the Asiatic continent, Japan's desire to annex China is not such a cause. Even a child knows that even if Japan had such an ambition it is utterly impracticable. Where, then, do motives of war exist? They are latent in the three questions of Korea, Shantung, and Siberia."

When I wrote the article from which I have just quoted there certainly existed the three possible causes of war which I have mentioned; but none of them now exists, for even those Americans in Korea who were at one time most anti-Japanese are now agreed that Japan's administration in the peninsula is a most benevolent one, and the activities of Korean sympathizers in America have now fortunately dwindled. With regard to our policy

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toward China and Siberia, as is well known, we have now returned Shantung to our neighbor and we have also withdrawn from Siberia. Not only have we done that, but we are now on good terms with China and also, unfortunately, with Russia. I have said "unfortunately," for I am no admirer of the gentlemen who hold the reins of government at Moscow. During the last twenty-five years I have been a staunch supporter of a thorough understanding and good friendship with Great Britain and America, but have always abhorred the idea of *rapprochement* with Germany and Russia, and I have no hesitation in saying that I am viewing with much concern the friendly attention which the bolshevik government is paying to my country.

From what I have said, it is clear that there is now no possible cause of war between America and Japan. Regarding our navy, which is the third in strength among the navies of the world, let me again quote from my article of 1920:

"The naval expansion of Japan," I proceeded to say, "is passive, and therefore, it is merely defensive and self-protective. If we entertained aggressive designs against America, five 'eight-and-eight' fleets would not be sufficient to vanquish America with all her geographical advantages, her boundless wealth, her invincible spirit, and her un-

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surpassed scientific knowledge. With one 'eight-and-eight' fleet perfected, Japan may perhaps be able to defend herself against foreign aggression, but our armaments and our national resources alike forbid us to be aggressive against any strong power. We are a poor nation and shall be the first to welcome any reliable arrangement for restriction of armaments, but I am afraid that a paper arrangement of the kind avails little, unless the various questions liable to lead to a clash are thoroughly settled. So I will proceed to express my views and suggestions on those questions for the approval of the intelligent sections of the American and Japanese peoples."

Regarding a possible cause of war, namely, the Korean issue, which was then assuming rather serious aspects, I said:

"The annexation of Korea was approved by all the powers at the time. In her independent days, Korea was really a ruined country in every social respect. The people had been harrassed by a tyranny extending over several centuries, and there had been no security of person and property. And the endless Russian intrigues there had been a constant menace to the welfare of this nation and the peace of the Far East. Things are now changed. The peace of the Far East is guaranteed,

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civilisation is rapidly progressing in Korea, and the general welfare of the Koreans has greatly increased. The royal family of Yi is now actually related to our imperial family. What will be the feelings of American sympathisers of refractory Koreans when they compare these facts to the fate of the royal family of Hawaii after its annexation to America?"

Concerning another possible cause of friction, namely, the American activities in China, I said:

"My countrymen are apt to attach great importance to a 'special position' or 'special interests' in China, more especially in Manchuria and Mongolia, but interests on paper will be of little avail unless they are backed up by real strength and Chinese amity. I am for the open door with reference to the whole of China, because that will be in the interest of China, Japan, and other powers as well. In this connection, I have a hope to express to America. American activities in China are of two classes. One is worthy of all praise and admiration, while the other is highly unworthy of America, a champion of justice. Educational work of Americans in China and the active operations of American merchants there are of the former class. The latter classes comprise the movements of biassed non-business Americans making anti-Japanese



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propaganda their sole business, and American adventurers who feed upon newspapers and reviews and also upon China. It is beyond imagination how adroitly these men instigate the Chinese and how badly they injure Sino-Japanese and American-Japanese relations. As for the way, however, in which the Americans build universities and middle schools everywhere in China at enormous cost and send out presidents, principals, and teachers of admirable character for the benefit of their far-sighted China policy, I am compelled to take my hat off to it, though I am well aware of the unfavourable results to this country accruing from this great work of the Americans."

Dwelling upon the consequence of war between America and Japan, I argued:

"I repeat that an American-Japanese war would be a great sin against civilisation. Whichever side may win an ultimate victory, it would be hard for the other powers to look on passively. Should Japan win, there would be racial strife. In case an ultimate victory lay with the United States, that would lead to a rivalry for sea-power between Britain and America. In this connection, a certain Japanese gentleman, who was formerly a well-known diplomat and is now publishing an influential review, wrote from Europe, where he

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was, to a certain influential paper here, that Britain and France were eagerly anxious for the outbreak of a war between America and Japan. But this was a great mistake. Of course there are jingoes even in England who may be glad to have misfortunes fall to other countries. When I was in England, a certain Britisher came to me one day and informed me that a certain statesman had spoken that day to the effect that British business men might feel easy about the future, as Japan also would sooner or later be confronted with serious difficulties about labour questions. In reply, I said that for my part I should not like to see Britain in such difficulties. Nor did I wish misfortune to America, France, Italy, and China, or even to Germany and Turkey [I should like to add the words, 'and even to Russia' !]. The interests of the countries of the world after the war were so interwoven that no country could suffer misfortune without others being immediately affected. Should Germany be bolshevised, Italy would fare likewise, and the plague would spread to other countries also. This is a consideration to which I referred when I had the honour of seeing President Wilson.

"In short, in the possible event of an American-Japanese war, Britain, who is so solicitous about the peace of the world and the amity of America

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and Japan for financial considerations as well as by reasons of labour difficulties, would ultimately get involved in the trouble, and other countries would also have to follow suit. The result would be higher prices, more intensified class enmity, a world bolshevised and plunged into chaos and darkness."

I have quoted at such length from my article because most of what I said five years ago still holds good, and because I feel convinced that America and Japan will never fight and must never fight; for a war between these two countries is a crime against mankind and a sin against God.

Of course, it must not be forgotten that there are jingoes in both countries. There are not a few Japanese who say that America is selfish. They say that the United States is worse than pre-war Germany. They maintain that with her unlimited wealth and strength she will try to swallow China, and after she has done so she will place the South American republics under her tutelage, and finally will come to hold the hegemony of the world. It was Japan who brought the once arrogant China to her knees. It was also Japan who exposed to the world the signs of decadence of the great Muscovite Empire. "America is a bully," these Japanese jingoes say, "and we should not be afraid of her."

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"America's diplomacy is cunning and her attitude hypocritical," they declare, "and therefore no stone should be left unturned to thwart her ambition of seizing China ultimately by peaceful means." It is a question of life and death for us, they think. Even if we do not fight America now, she will sooner or later threaten our very existence. There was a chance for us to beat Russia and we made full use of it; but against America there is no such chance. "War or no war," they say, "the result will be just the same. Far better to die with our swords in our hands than die a lingering death." This is the sum total of what our jingoes say. Happily, however, there are only a few people who thus argue, and the majority of those who have taken even the slightest pains to study military matters are of the opinion that war between America and Japan is impossible for physical reasons.

During the Great War, although France and the other Allies were most anxious that Japan should send an expeditionary force to the western front, we did not, for the simple reason that it was physically impossible. Even if we had decided to send troops to the theater of war we should never have been able to maintain more than one hundred thousand soldiers; for, in order to keep our expedi-

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tionary force at this strength and to supply them with food and munitions and other necessary equipments, we should have had to employ our mercantile shipping for that purpose—a thing which was obviously impossible.

Now, assume for a moment that Australia has become independent, that Japan with aggressive designs has declared war upon her, and that for some unknown reason Great Britain refused to give assistance to her former dominion. It should be remembered that, during the world-war, Australia and New Zealand sent to the seat of war a half-million gallant soldiers known as Anzacs. A country who was able to send an expeditionary force of five hundred thousand can easily mobilize twice that number in order to defend her shores. For Japan to defeat a million gallant Anzacs, it would be necessary to send at least an equal number of troops. In order to maintain the strength of our expeditionary force and to supply them with food, clothing, ammunitions, and other necessary equipments, it would require at least three times the mercantile marine which we now possess. It is thus clear that we cannot subdue Australia, even if no power assists her. If it is evident that war is impossible, for physical reasons, between Japan and Australia, which is a small power with a population

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of only about eight million, is it not as clear as daylight that, for similar reasons, war is impossible between America and Japan? The former is the richest, the greatest, and the strongest power in the world, while the latter is the third greatest naval power, whose position in the Far East is impregnable. As long as Japan is on the defensive, no power will succeed in destroying her navy—to say nothing of the impossibility of landing a single soldier on her shores.

Having thus argued, I am now in a position to declare again most emphatically that war between America and Japan is impossible for physical reasons as well as for moral reasons.

Perhaps it may not be out of place here to quote again from the speech of our Foreign Minister which he delivered on the opening day of the last session of the Imperial Diet. Regarding our relations with the United States, especially the immigration question, Baron Shidehara said:

As for our relations with the United States, it is evident that the two nations should live in cordial friendship for all time and co-operate with each other in the great mission of promoting the peace and security of the Pacific regions and of the world. We are confident that these views are shared by a vast majority of the American people.

With regard to the discriminatory clause against Japanese in the Immigration Act of the United States of 1924, which we



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regret, I explained in the last session of the Diet the circumstances attending the insertion of that clause and the views of the government on the subject. The question still remains unsettled. It should, however, be remembered that a law cannot be modified except by law, and that under the constitutional system of the United States, the legislature is entirely independent of the executive. It is obvious, therefore, that the continuance of discussions between the two governments at this time will not, in itself, serve any useful purpose. What is really important in the final analysis of the question is that the American people shall come to have a correct understanding of our people and of our points of view. Impetuous mood or impassioned utterances will not conduce to international understanding. There is no doubt that the same love of justice that kindled American independence still continues to inspire the minds of the American people. The day will come when this fact will be fully demonstrated.

In concluding his speech, the Foreign Minister said:

In conclusion, I wish to repeat that the guiding principle of our foreign policy is to safeguard and promote our legitimate rights and interests, with due respect to those of other nations, and to advance international co-operation, instead of international antagonism. In acting on this line of policy, we trust that we may count upon the approval and support of the people.

The present lecturer in an hour's speech vigorously attacked the Foreign Office, especially its Intelligence Department, for its inactivity in trying to dispel anti-Japanism, which has been in vogue

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during the last few years in Great Britain, America, and China. I can do nothing better than to quote from that speech:

“In reviewing the course of Japanese diplomacy” during the last few years,” said the interpellator, “I feel constrained to ask the Foreign Minister what the Intelligence Department has done to justify its existence. While the Intelligence Department is sleeping over its work, the tendency is growing abroad to misunderstand Japan. Foreign misunderstanding and suspicion of Japan has manifested itself in concrete form in two important things, and these are the Singapore base scheme and America’s grand naval manœuvres. The world-war was to be a war to end war. I believe that Japan took this view when she joined it. The Washington Conference was the gospel of peace for the world. I trust that in taking part in that Conference Japan was actuated by a desire to promote the permanent peace of the world. And yet the world remains ‘an armed camp,’ though six years have already elapsed since the Armistice was signed and three years have gone by since the Washington Conference. In my opinion, no country in the world is so peacefully disposed as Japan at present. Since the Washington Conference the whole people of Japan have disarmed spiritually.

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A country which was profoundly martial has come to turn her back upon everything military. Thus, Japan has carried out a reduction of armaments twice already of her own accord, notwithstanding the fact that other powers were bent upon piling up armaments. Although the Minister of War declares that army reduction causes no defect in national defence, it is clear that defence will be weakened by the extent of reduction. The proposed military training of students is presumably for the purpose of making up for this defect. Politicians who are blind to the trend of world-affairs and some professors and students are opposed to the military training scheme.

“Few peoples are so peacefully disposed, perhaps idiotically so, as the Japanese. And yet, Japan is an object of wide foreign misunderstanding. What, then, is the cause of this misunderstanding? In my opinion, four causes may be given. The first cause is the Sino-Japanese War, which Japan was obliged to wage for self-defence. The second is the Russo-Japanese War, which was forced upon Japan. Before taking up arms against Russia, Japan had made concession on concession and pocketed one insult after another. The third is the Twenty-one Demands, or what is left of them. There are only two demands left out of twenty-one,

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and these two demands are both essential for maintaining peace in the Far East. The last is the Siberian expedition, which was opposed by public opinion in this country, by some members of the Diplomatic Advisory Council, and by some of the government authorities at the time, but which Japan was obliged to undertake in compliance with the Allied demand. When once the expedition was undertaken seven thousand troops were found inadequate, and the force had to be increased considerably. The withdrawal of large forces naturally took much time, and delays were occasioned culminating in the creation of misunderstandings in foreign minds. If Japan can rightly be denounced as an aggressive country because she fought two wars of self-defence, committed a diplomatic blunder once, and sent an expedition to Siberia in obedience to the Allied demand, what power can escape the same accusation? Had Japan had aggressive designs, she would not have let slip the many opportunities she has had for carrying them out—opportunities which presented themselves very often during the war. As a matter of fact, the Japanese government and people did what the geographical position of their country could permit for the Allied cause, and Japan's distinguished services are appreciatively noted in a book written

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by no less person than Mr. Winston Churchill, the present British Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was First Lord of the Admiralty at the time.

“The friendly powers whom Japan did her best to help in their time of exhaustion are now recovered from their war wounds, and they now stand four-square on their own solid bases; while, on the other hand, Japan is reduced to great distress financially. The great earthquake-fire consumed in forty-eight hours one-tenth of Japan’s wealth, and it is expected that the process of rehabilitation will take scores of years. How can Japan in her present exhausted state ever adopt an aggressive policy toward countries who have fully recovered from the effects of the war? The idea is simply preposterous. I therefore most sincerely regret that the foreign powers are still obsessed by these absurd misconceptions. This deplorable state of things is, I believe, due to the absolute incompetence of the Intelligence Department, which was created for the express purpose of dispelling foreign misunderstandings. Japan, Britain, and America are the three most healthy countries of the world. I think I can say without exaggeration that it was owing to the healthy existence of these powers that the world has hitherto been immune from bolshevisation. These powers are barriers against the

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bolshevisation of the world. If by any chance a serious collision should occur among these countries the world's civilisation will go down in ruins."

In replying to the attack, the Foreign Minister said:

Count Soyeshima referred to Japan's pacifism, and suggested that the Intelligence Department in the Foreign Office was not properly fulfilling the mission for which it had been created. As everybody knows, Japan pursued a policy of exclusion for several centuries, and when, after that long period of exclusion she took her place among the nations of the world, she found that she lived in an age in which the strong preyed on the weak, and that imperialism, militarism, and the principles of aggression and territorial aggrandisement were in vogue everywhere. Japan's position among the countries devoted to such principles was, indeed, very perilous and insecure. This brought home to her the need of providing herself with sufficient strength to defend herself. She therefore set about the building of her army and navy. Subsequently she went through two great wars, the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars. One thing which caused the gravest anxiety to the Japanese government and people in those days was how the safety of the Empire could be preserved and how the national existence could be maintained. Nobody dreamt of adopting an aggressive policy toward any other country. As for foreign countries, they fully understood Japan's attitude in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, and took a sympathetic view of her position. No criticism or accusation whatever was then levelled at her by foreign critics as an aggressive country. About the close of the world-war, or, about



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the time the Peace Conference was called, foreign misunderstanding and misgiving about Japan's true intentions began, and there was a sudden growth of pernicious propaganda against her. Canards alleging Japan's aggressive designs upon China found vigorous circulation about that time. Notwithstanding the fact that Japan's attitude in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars was neither misconstrued nor unfavorably criticised at the time of the outbreak of these wars, criticisms began to appear suggesting that those wars were fought by Japan for aggressive purposes. I do not care to go this time into the question of why or by whom such mischievous propaganda was put into circulation. Nor do I desire to make any public statement regarding these points. In any case, we were accused of things of which we were entirely innocent. To take a fair and dispassionate view of things, it may be that the Japanese government in the past made a number of diplomatic blunders. The foreign policy which I am now pursuing may not be quite satisfactory to you. But I firmly believe that no diplomatic action in the past was actuated by aggressive motives. Fortunately, since the Washington Conference the anti-Japanese propaganda deliberately engineered has been fast subsiding.

What particularly embarrasses us is not pernicious anti-Japanese propaganda, but a lack of knowledge on the part of foreigners about Japan's true intentions. It is due to their ignorance of the national conditions of Japan. Many unfounded reports have hitherto been circulated because of the lack of true understanding about Japan's attitude. We have no intention of setting propaganda against propaganda, for I am of opinion that propaganda warfare is an out-of-date practice.

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From the quotations I have made from the two speeches of Baron Shidehara, Japan's policy not only toward America but toward the other powers is quite clear. And with regard to the immigration question, as the Foreign Minister said, all that we can do is to rely upon that sense of justice which kindled American independence and which still continues to inspire the minds of the overwhelming majority of the great American people. Japan has never asked for permission to send an unrestricted number of immigrants. All that she asks for is equal treatment with the European countries, that is to say, the right to send a certain number of immigrants on the quota basis, namely, one hundred and forty-six per annum.

Before I sit down I should like to read the concluding portion of an interview I gave to the *Japan Times* shortly before I left Japan:

"America and Japan, facing each other across the Pacific Ocean, must unite their best efforts to promote peace and tranquillity in the regions of the Pacific. We must dispel mutual suspicion and misunderstanding, and we must promote mutual respect and confidence which are essential for friendly co-operation. Though the forms of the two governments may differ, yet the ideals of the two peoples are one. The love of liberty, peace, and

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progress is inherent in the hearts of the two peoples. Japan has had her history of twenty-five centuries and the continuous succession of the imperial family, so unique in the history of mankind. Successive emperors took the reins of the government, and the people have always remained the foundations and loyal bulwark of the country. She has had a monarchical form of government, but her history has never seen tyrants; and the Japanese people have always enjoyed a large measure of freedom. Today, we have a constitutional monarchy which is similar to that of Great Britain. In the form and fundamental principles of government, there is no difference between the governments of England and Japan. On the other hand, from the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth to the present day, America has been the vanguard of liberty and justice; and she has been our friend for more than half-a-century. Hence, the friendly co-operation of America and Japan together with Great Britain will mean a great asset for peace in the Pacific.

“There are no issues between America and Japan that need the arbitrament of arms for settlement. If the jingoes of our countries succeed in bringing our two nations into collision, we shall have to see international chaos, revolution, and the destruction of our civilization. However, I

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have confidence in the sound common sense of our two peoples and I know that they will not be easily swayed by the agitations of jingoes and demagogues who are seeking to embroil us into a scramble.

“So long as the American people are led by the noble ideals of so grand a figure as Abraham Lincoln, we can depend upon them and trust them, and co-operate with them. While I am going to the University of Chicago to deliver a series of lectures, I have the other important mission of making my pilgrimage to the tomb of the Great Emancipator at Springfield, Illinois, to lay a wreath of flowers in order to pay my homage to the memory of the ‘Saviour of his country.’ Lincoln has been the source of my inspiration.”



CHINA, THE FAR EAST, AND  
THE UNITED STATES

*By* P. W. Kuo





## I

### POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL TENDENCIES IN MODERN CHINA

The problems of the Far East are receiving greater attention today in this country than was the case a decade ago. This is one of the clear evidences that the American people fully realize that in the coming great era of the Pacific the Far East is to play an important part. The widespread interest in China and in her problems is particularly noticeable and significant.

Some are interested in China because they realize that the Chinese civilization represents one of the greatest civilizations of the world, from the point of view of art, of literature, and of philosophy, and that this ancient civilization, having been brought face to face with the civilization of the West through many points of contact, is bound to be of fundamental importance in the development of the world's new civilization. Others take an interest in China from the points of view of industry and of commerce, realizing that China is one of the greatest markets as well as one of the greatest reservoirs of raw material that the world

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has ever seen. There are also those who find in China's internal problems and foreign relations abundant material for interesting and profitable study. Without inquiring further into the motives underlying the growing interest in the study of China, it is evident that a careful and sympathetic study of her conditions and problems by the American people will enable them to have a better understanding of her conditions and will pave the way for a closer relationship and more sympathetic cooperation. Such a movement is quite in keeping with the noble spirit and high ideal which prompted the establishment of the Harris Foundation in this University under whose auspices this Institute of Far Eastern Affairs is being held, and I consider it a great privilege to have been invited to have an humble share in this noble undertaking, namely, the promotion of better understanding among nations.

Confucius once said: "To review what is old and to learn something new, that is the duty of the scholar." In the spirit of this teaching, we should review something of the past history of a nation before studying her present conditions. But in the treatment of China, this would be too difficult a task to undertake, having, as she does, a history extending over four thousand years. Even a review

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of the important happenings of modern times would occupy more space and time than we can afford. We are obliged, therefore, to make a brief statement of her immediate past in order that the present may receive more adequate attention. The Chinese people, after having been governed under a monarchy for over forty centuries and having been influenced by the lessons learned in her contact with other nations, decided in 1911, after a successful revolution against the old régime, to adopt the republican form of government and start on her way to a modern democracy. As the path leading to democracy is often thorny in character, so during the fourteen years that followed there have been much unrest and disturbance in the life of this newborn republic.

In brief, there have been eight changes in the presidency; two unsuccessful attempts at the restoration of monarchy; repeated dissolutions of the parliament; at one time or another some form of opposing government has been established in Canton, with two parliaments sitting at the same time, each claiming constitutionality; and now and then military and political parties have found cause to group themselves in one way or another either to declare independence from the central government or to wage war one with the other. The latest de-

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velopments are still fresh in the minds of the public. In September last the greatest conflict of the period was waged between the forces of the Chihli party, on the one hand, and those of the so-called Triple Alliance, on the other. The Chihli party was the dominant military party then in power, while the Triple Alliance, consisting of Fengtien, Chekiang, and the southern government in Canton, was the group not satisfied with the central government. While the conflict was on, Feng Yu-hsiang, one of the generals under Wu Pei-fu, the leader of the Chihli party affected a coup d'état resulting in the defeat of Wu Pei-fu and the collapse of the Chihli forces. With this turn of events, President Tsáo Kun, whose election was considered illegal because of the use of bribery, was made a prisoner and in order to remove the last possibility of the restoration of monarchy, the boy-emperor was expelled from his old palace.

Marshal Tuan Chí-jui, the veteran soldier and leader of the Anfu party, was considered the man of the hour, and was made the chief executive of the provisional government to meet the emergency. He proposed to call two conferences to settle the perplexing problems of the day, the Rehabilitation Conference and the Citizens' Conference. The former was called according to promise, and al-

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though its achievements failed to come up to the expectation of the people, it succeeded in formulating a plan for the calling of the Citizens' Conference, which is expected to revise the existing constitution for China, upon the basis of which a permanent and constitutional government may be organized. This state of affairs naturally has had its evil effects. The central government is made unstable; its financial condition is more or less precarious; the mandates of the president oftentimes become ineffective; and banditry becomes rampant in certain parts of the country. All these should be speedily and effectively remedied. It is but natural that some observers of China become discouraged over the situation. Some of the more pessimistic ones become impatient and begin to raise the question as to whether or not China is actually ready for a republic. Others go so far as to think that the events of the past few years seem to show that the Chinese people are not able to manage their national affairs and that some form of international control over certain phases of her administration would be desirable if not inevitable.

Such misgivings would have been entirely justifiable were it not for the fact that the situation in China is not as deplorable as it appears on the surface. As every dark cloud has its silver lining, so



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the situation in China has its bright aspects. To begin with, one has to acknowledge that the task of creating a modern democratic government is by no means an easy one and certainly requires a considerable amount of time to do it well, especially in the case of China, a nation possessing more than one-quarter of the human race, covering a territory more extensive than the combined territories of the United States and Central America, and having a history and a tradition richer than any other ancient civilization. The fact that confusion and disorder have more or less existed during the fourteen years since the proclamation of the republic should not be taken as an evidence that her people are unfit for democracy and have no possibility of becoming a united and constitutional state. What modern democracies in Europe or America did not pass through initial stages of internal discord, marked by revolutions, bitter parliamentary discussions, attempted secession of provinces, and civil war? True it is, China is expected to profit by the experience of other nations and shorten her period of experimentation, but "Rome was not built in a day." A modern democracy cannot be created overnight by revolution, but rather through the slow process of evolution.

Moreover, the political troubles of this period of

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transition and readjustment, while fraught with dangers and causing a certain amount of suffering among the people, have not had as serious an effect upon China as similar troubles would have had in a Western country. So far, the political life of China has never been highly organized, and to a certain extent this is true today. It is a weakness but at the same time a source of strength. Hence the troubles of recent years, though they loom large in the chronicles of the day, do not actually reach very deeply into the life of the Chinese people. This accounts for the singular fact that, in spite of all the political upheavals and controversies, China and her people have made noteworthy progress.

In certain instances the unfortunate happenings have been either greatly misrepresented or misunderstood. Take, for example, the fact that the recent civil wars in China have given some people the erroneous impression that the Chinese people are divided and that there is no unity among them. As a matter of fact, whatever division there is in China, it is confined to the military and political leaders and their mercenary soldiers. So far as the people are concerned, they are absolutely united. The old demarcation of provincialism is greatly weakened, and the spirit of unity has

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never been as strong as it is today. Thus we find that national organizations in education, in commerce, in industry, and in other interests have come into existence, in which representatives from all parts of the country are united in their endeavor to carry out programs calculated to benefit the whole country.

The underlying causes of the political unrest of this period are many and varied. On the one hand, there have been repeated struggles against the restoration of monarchy, the continuous fighting for a constitution and for constitutionality; and, on the other hand, there have been rivalry among military leaders, party politics, personal ambition, and other selfish interests. A certain amount of international complication also comes into play in some of the struggles and contentions. The illicit import and sale of arms and ammunition on the part of foreign nations give encouragement to and make possible frequent outbreaks of warfare among military leaders of rival factions. Aside from these causes, there have been also certain definite political principles in which the military and political leaders believe and for which they have been willing to struggle and sacrifice. First, there are those who believe that China can only be welded together by a strong central government

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and that her unification can only be affected through military force. Marshal Wu Pei-fu, the defeated leader of the Chihli party, is a strong believer in this principle, and this belief is even shared by certain foreign powers having interests in China for reasons which are not far to seek. The supporters of this idea would like to see a strong man at the head of the government and would give him strong powers to cope with the situation. Then there are those who believe that the varying needs of different parts of China can best be met through the establishment of a federal system of government, allotting to the central authority the conduct of foreign affairs, communications, and other functions which concern the nation as a whole, and leaving all other matters to provincial autonomy and control. This movement, which is gaining in popularity, has made some progress, as is shown in the adoption of provincial constitutions on the part of certain more progressive provinces, such as Chekiang and Hunan, and it is likely to be favorably considered during the coming Citizens' Conference.

There is a third movement, that of the National Patriotic League, headed by Hsu Chien, which has been urging the adoption of a system by which the central government would be conducted

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by a central commission of one hundred persons, the members of which would be elected by the Citizens' Conference, which would itself take the place of the parliament as the legislative body of the nation, while the provincial governments would be conducted by a provincial central commission composed of nine persons elected by the Provincial Citizens' Conferences, which would take the place of legislative bodies for the provinces. The chairman of the commission in each case would be the chief executive, thus doing away with the office of the president and with that of the governor. The fundamental idea of this commission plan of government is to secure for the people direct participation in and control of the affairs of the government. This plan, which is unique in character, received certain suggestions from the constitution of the Union of Soviet Republics and from that of Switzerland. Inasmuch as this movement is still in its infancy, and the practicability of the working of the system is yet to be proved, it is considered as being radical, and the possibility of its adoption is uncertain and doubtful.

In addition to these general political tendencies which have been the cause of much political unrest, there have been other movements that are vital toward the solution of China's perplexing

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problems. One of them is to separate the civil authority from that of the military, or to prevent militarists from interfering with civil matters. Since Yuan Shih-kai's time China has been more or less under a military régime. The policy of the central government has been greatly influenced by militarists in power. In most of the provinces there are two governors—one military and the other civil. Nominally, the military governor is in charge of military affairs, while the civil governor has charge of civil affairs, such as finance, education, and industry. As a matter of fact, the military governor often overstretches his power and interferes with civil matters especially in time of disturbance. This is also true with those supermilitary governors appointed to take charge of a group of provinces. In a few provinces the powers of two offices are given to one man. Another movement is to abolish altogether the system of provincial military governors which has been more or less responsible for the growing weakness of the central government and the conflicts between rival factions. In principle, the office of these military governors has been abolished, but the change so far has been more or less nominal, and much is yet left to be done.

There is another movement in which the people



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are greatly concerned, namely, the reduction of the existing army, whose maintenance forms a very heavy burden upon the national treasury. According to the report submitted by the ministry of war to the Rehabilitation Conference, China had, during 1919, an army numbering between 1,400,000 and 1,500,000, and spent \$260,000,000 (Mex.) which represents more than half of the total budget of the year, which was \$490,000,000 (Mex.). For the solution of this difficult problem a number of schemes are being contemplated. Some advocate that the superfluous soldiers should be utilized to build national highways good for motor traffic, as has been done in certain provinces such as Chekiang and Shansi. Others urge the establishment of more industrial plants, making possible the turning of disbanded soldiers into useful artisans and craftsmen. As a preparation for this, vocational education has been introduced in the armies of progressive military leaders. The use of soldiers for conservancy work is another solution that has been urged. But perhaps the solution which is meeting with the greatest popular favor is that of making use of the soldiers for colonization work on the western frontier, in Tibet, Mongolia, and certain northwestern and northeastern provinces and special districts, as is being advocated by Feng

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Yu-hsiang. Meanwhile, the government has made known its decision to reduce the army to 500,000 soldiers and the budget of the army and navy to \$150,000,000 (Mex.), while a military rehabilitation commission is being organized to deal with the problem.

From earlier references made one can draw the conclusion that the political parties in China, as in other countries, represent an important factor in her political life. Thus far the political power is not held alternately by two great national parties, as is the case in the United States, but is exercised by the dominant group of parties in league with the dominant military faction which happens to be in power. This constitutes one of the sources of China's political instability, for parliamentary government has attained its highest success usually in those countries where political power is held alternately by two great national parties. Moreover, the existing political organizations, whether in the form of a party, a faction, or a club, have been lacking in stability and in definite policy. The best organized party, one with a definite platform, is known as the *Kuomintang*, or "People's party," which, however, upon the recent death of Sun Yat-sen, was left for the time being without a leader. Meanwhile, a number of new parties have recently

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come into existence or are in the process of formation, to add their influence to the sum total of political life.

After this cursory survey of the political tendencies and movements in China, we shall now turn our attention to her economic life and see what factors are working for change and what new problems have been brought into existence. One of the important factors affecting the economic life is communications, which have been greatly extended. All parts of China have been connected by telegraph. The postal system has extended its facilities, and is now maintaining relations with foreign countries adequate to meet all requirements. This system has in recent years reached such a high degree of efficiency that at the Washington Conference the four powers having foreign postal agencies decided to withdraw them immediately. The development of railways has not been as rapid as one would expect, owing to internal political unrest and international complications. But it is the plan of the government to develop the existing and future railways in accordance with a general program that will meet the economic, industrial, and commercial requirements of China. Plans for the construction of long-distance telephone and air services between princi-

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pal cities have been made, but have been held up, owing to political changes and international complications.

Since 1921 there has been in existence in China a movement known as the Good Roads Movement, which is being advocated by the National Good Roads Association. Within the short period of three years, the Association has accomplished results of permanent value which justify its continued existence and popular support. The movement is attracting nation-wide attention. It has now over twenty branch associations and ten thousand members. It has enlisted as its supporters many leaders in various walks of life. Even the militarists are interested in it, and some of them have been making use of their soldiers as road-builders. Already some 12,934 miles of good roads have been built through the direct influence of the Association. As a natural consequence, the newly built roads have occasioned the establishment of many motor-car companies and the importation of a large number of motor busses from foreign countries, especially from the United States of America. The extension and improvement of these various ways of communication, together with the introduction of scientific method and mechanical power to ways of production, will hasten the development

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of China's natural resources, the progress of her commerce and industry, and the betterment of her economic conditions.

The problem of financial rehabilitation, which has an important bearing upon China's economic life, is, to say the least, as perplexing as the problem of military rehabilitation, involving as it does the disbandment of troops, reorganization of the revenues of the central government and the provinces, the abolition of *likin*, the system of internal taxation, and the increasing of customs revenues. It is not surprising, therefore, that although the problem has been tackled by the Financial Rehabilitation Commission and by the recent Rehabilitation Conference, no comprehensive plan has yet been devised, and the question has been left for further consideration to a new commission that is being organized. Owing to the growing strength of the militarists and other reasons, the provinces have the tendency to withhold from Peking funds which should be remitted. This is responsible for the inability of the central government to fulfil some of its obligations, and for other embarrassments which it has been obliged to face. This state of affairs naturally has given cause for alarm to foreigners having financial interests in China. Some of them with good intentions suggest

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that some sort of "Dawes Plan for China" be organized for the purpose of reorganizing her finances. As a matter of fact, the financial difficulty in China is not as serious as it appears on the surface to be. To quote Mr. Julean Arnold, the American Commercial Attaché at Peking:

China is financially solvent and sound, as the country has never departed from a specie basis and has not, during the period of war or since, suffered from inflated currency. China's outstanding obligations are no greater than the funded debt of the city of New York. Its per capita foreign debt is about \$2.50, which is very low, especially in the light of China's wonderful resources in man-power and raw materials.

We are inclined to share the views of Mr. Arnold. The financial trouble in China is not economic but political. There is every reason to believe that as soon as a stable government is maintained, her financial status will be greatly improved.

That China is bound to become one of the greatest industrial nations of the world is a foregone conclusion, possessing as she does an abundant supply of coal, iron, man-power, and other necessary elements of a great industrial nation. But that she has been able to make great strides in this direction, in spite of her internal unrest and political instability, reveals the strength as well as the resources of her people. While exact statistics



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are not available, it is safe to say that there are at least fourteen hundred modern factories now operating under Chinese management with every indication of their further development.

This rapid growth of modern industry in China, affecting as it does the social and economic as well as the political life of the Chinese people, has created new problems pressing for immediate solution. Although modern industry is still in its infancy, the workers in industry, directly or indirectly influenced by the modern socialistic views of Marx, Lenin, and others, are rapidly developing a class consciousness and, as a result, hundreds of labor unions have been organized to promote and to protect their interests. Already many labor strikes have taken place, resulting in the increase of wages and the giving of other privileges to laborers, and it may be said that some of the labor unions are the direct result of successful strikes.

With a view to mitigating the evils of modern industrialism, and in order to avoid any serious clash between the employer and the employee, thus retarding the progress of industry, thinking people in China have begun to make serious efforts to improve existing labor conditions through direct and accurate studies of labor conditions, through the encouragement of welfare work among the labor-

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ers and through agitation for better legislation. Already some of the more progressive leaders in industry have taken steps to improve the existing order through the introduction of shorter hours of labor, better sanitary conditions, and profit-sharing schemes. A beginning has been made in conducting welfare work among the workmen. Thus one of the modern industries in Shanghai known as the Commercial Press has provision for pensions, maternity allowances, medical care, educational facilities, and recreational and social amenities for its staff, while a considerable amount is set aside out of its profits to be distributed as a bonus. And in compliance with the needs of the time, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce promulgated in 1923 two sets of regulations, one for factory-workers and the other for miners, which represent the beginning of government legislation in industry. It remains to be seen whether China, profiting by the experience of the West and taking the necessary precautions in due time, will be able to usher in the impending industrial revolution with a minimum of suffering and a maximum of human happiness.

For the time being, the most important factor in the economic life of China is agriculture, upon which she has always depended for her economic stability and prosperity. Its importance can be

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realized when we recall that the farming population in China is as great as three hundred million, representing over 80 per cent of her total population. The fact that 75 per cent of the goods exported consists in agricultural products shows their importance to foreign trade. The success of modern industry will depend largely upon the quantity and quality of the raw material produced by agriculture. For China to neglect agriculture, therefore, would be to ignore the welfare of the majority of her people and to overlook the chief source of her economic strength. Realizing the importance of this fact, the National Southeastern University, the Peking Agricultural College, the Canton Christian College, the University of Nanking, and other government and private agencies have been introducing modern scientific methods in agriculture, achieving results in the improvement of cotton, of wheat, and of silk which show the possibility of raising the whole economic structure of society to a higher plane.

The commercial aspect of China's economic life is closely related to her industrial and agricultural life. In spite of political disturbances, foreign trade has advanced steadily every year during the past twenty years, each succeeding year's return being in advance of its predecessors. The trade of China

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in 1923 was 1,676,320,303 *Hai Kwan taels*, which represents an increase of 76,378,720 *Hai Kwan taels* over the preceding year's total.<sup>1</sup> During the past year conditions in China have been most unfavorable for trade, and it was expected that trade statistics would reveal extreme economic depression. But facts proved to be to the contrary. The customs figures show that the export and import duties collected in 1924 total 169,000,000, or 6,000,000 *Hai Kwan taels* ahead of all previous records. The anomaly of a rising customs revenue in adverse times can be easily explained. China is so great that although much of the country may be paralyzed by disasters of various kinds, the population of the remainder is so increasingly prosperous that the volume of trade is maintained. Whether or not this is a correct explanation, the surprising fact remains that, in spite of discouragement, the volume of business has not been affected, and the national wealth is slowly but surely increasing. Given a good government and the maintenance of better civil order, there is every assurance that China will rise to a high economic level.

The impression is abroad that the political and economic unrest in China makes her a fertile soil

<sup>1</sup> A *tael* is a unit of account reckoned at approximately seventy-five cents gold.

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for the spread of bolshevism and communism. This is true to a very limited extent. It is true that the apostles of destruction have found their way into China as in other countries, that they have won the sympathy of certain radical elements dissatisfied with the present state of things, and that they are utilizing every opportunity and capitalizing every disturbance to their advantage. They are, however, being strongly opposed by the Chinese people in general, who hold the firm belief that both bolshevism and communism are undesirable and impracticable in China as they are against the psychology and tradition of the Chinese people. At least the present government is taking stringent measures toward the suppression of the propaganda. The recent disturbance in China, which originated through a strike in a Japanese mill, and which has since been directed toward the improvement of conditions under the municipal council of the Shanghai settlement and the revision of the so-called unequal treaties, is an expression of the desire of new China to realize her legitimate ambitions, and is essentially a patriotic and nationalistic movement which is gaining in strength.

The changes in the political and economic life of China have brought about changes in her social life. Under the old régime the family formed the

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social, industrial, and political unit in Chinese society. In modern times the growth of modern industry, the development of ways of communication, and the introduction of new ideas of personal liberty have had a tendency to weaken home ties and thus undermine the very foundation of the social agency which has been an effective force in the life of the Chinese people for many centuries. The demands of modern times too, called for direct participation in political and economic life on the part of the individual instead of through the medium of the family. This tendency toward disintegration of the family, in turn, is being remedied by the creation of other agencies of co-operative effort—social, economic, and political—consistent with the larger conception of the individual's relationship to his community and his country.

As a result of the changing conditions and conceptions of society, the old standards of morality are being questioned, while new standards are in the process of formation. During this period of transition one sometimes faces the difficulty of not knowing what standards to follow and with which to judge the right conduct of living.

In modern China public opinion has become a very strong factor in all political and social movements. Formerly, the public in general paid little



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or no attention to affairs of the state, believing as they did that as long as they were not in government service they were not supposed to participate in its affairs. In recent years through the spread of modern education, the rapid growth of the modern press, and the influence of the student movement, through sufferings and humiliations, there have been developed a new patriotism and a new nationalism, and as a result this traditional attitude of indifference is giving way to an active interest in problems of government. Hence we see educational associations and chambers of commerce vieing with one another in making their influences felt in the determination of national and local problems. Truly the voice of the people in China is being heard in the government, and is becoming increasingly an important factor in the solution of her national problems. It is generally admitted that public opinion was the most decisive factor in the founding of the Chinese republic, in the downfall of Yuan Shih-kai, in the failure of the attempts to restore monarchy, and in other political and social movements of the day. This is one of the hopeful signs of the times, and its importance in the development of a democratic government can never be overemphasized. It becomes a problem to new China to educate and develop further this public

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opinion so that it will become an effective and constructive force for good in government and in community life.

Both a cause and a result of the weakening influence of the family is the change in the status of women. In modern China the sphere of women's activity is no longer confined to the home or 'to the field as it was in the days past, but it has been greatly extended. Their position in industry has been firmly established, and is becoming an important factor in economic life. Those who have the opportunity of education have found their way into the ranks of nurses, doctors, and teachers. The business career is now open to them. In Shanghai there exists a modern bank organized by women and operated by women but catering to both men and women. Coeducation has been introduced into China with success, and women have an equal opportunity with men in the pursuit of education. A special law school for women has been established in Shanghai. Educated women are taking an active interest in social service and in the affairs of government, and are becoming an increasingly important factor in modern society.

Education as a social process is naturally influenced by and in turn exerts its influence upon the political as well as the economic changes of the

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day. Indeed, in China, more than in any other country, education underlies the solution of all her problems. It is the most potent factor working for China's unification and regeneration. Such being the case, we cannot help being optimistic when we witness that in spite of her troubles China has made steady progress in modern education. The modern educational system, adopted in the first year of the Chinese republic (1911), was thoroughly reorganized in 1922, and is a decided advance over the old system, quite in keeping with world-movements in educational theory and practice and with the changing ideals and demands of modern China. The number of educational institutions has greatly increased, numbering, in 1923, 125 colleges and universities, 385 normal schools and institutes, 547 middle schools, 603 vocational schools, 10,236 higher primary schools, and 167,076 lower primary schools, while the enrolment in these modern schools increased from 2,933,387 in 1912 to 6,615,772 in 1923, representing an increase of over 100 per cent. China has introduced a phonetic script of thirty-nine characters to facilitate the spread of education and the unification of the spoken language. There has been a movement to substitute the spoken tongue, the vernacular, in place of the literary language as a medium of expression, similar

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to the movement to substitute modern languages for Latin which took place in Europe several centuries ago with all its significant influence.

But the most significant progress lies in the fundamental change in the ideals of education, which in turn has resulted in the improvement in method and content of education. One of the changes lies in the emphasis on the social aim in education. Under the old régime, education emphasized the ideal of individual culture, the health of the inner man. Now education is being regarded as a process to liberate men and women from selfish interests, and social efficiency has become a watchword. There is much that can be said in favor of this change from the old ideal, for to secure genuine democracy we must have citizens who are socially responsible with a devotion to public ends and an interest in public affairs.

With this changing conception of education, there has come a change in method and content of education. The ideal of social responsibility is being held up before the students. Student government and social service are being encouraged. Indeed, it is this new element in modern education which is responsible for the existence in China of the student movement, and it is this that explains the reason why the students are taking such a

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prominent part in the national life of China. Modern education has developed in them a strong sense of social responsibility, a desire to improve social, political, and industrial conditions. For this reason, they are most sensitive to social evils and, in a way, they are the reformers of China. They create public opinion. Their efforts have already been rewarded with success. They wield an influence the like of which is not found in any other country and which is bound to grow and to exert a strong influence in the upbuilding of new China. It is true that sometimes the students misuse their power, and sometimes are led astray, but on the whole, it is one of the hopeful signs of the time, and should not be taken as an expression of bolshevistic influence, as is sometimes done.

Then there is a tendency to emphasize freedom of education. For many centuries, the intellectual life of China was fettered to certain accepted standards of ideas and interpretations. But under the influence of a new impulse and a new attitude produced by direct contact with the ideas and methods of the modern world, there have come a revolution against authority and the rise of a critical spirit, manifested in the new birth of an old civilization, known as the New Thought Movement, or the Chinese Renaissance. This movement

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calls for a new estimation of traditional values and a revision of the old standards. Great changes have been thus produced in morals, literature, and social customs. In some quarters the tendency has gone too far. Instead of trying to revise the old system and conserve what has permanent value, there is sometimes an almost wholesale condemnation of traditional values and canons. The influence of this change in the method and content of education is seen in the emphasis on the study of the child—his interests and instincts—on self-activity or initiative, and in the wide introduction of project method, of the elective system, and of the Dalton Plan, and other means to develop initiative and natural interests.

There is also a tendency in Chinese education to place new emphasis upon scientific education as a reaction against the old one-sided emphasis on spiritual culture, seen in the efforts that are being made to improve the methods of teaching science, in the application of scientific methods in education as well as in the study of history, philosophy, and literature. This is a happy tendency, for in the words of Dr. Paul Monroe: "The great need in the intellectual life of the Chinese is the introduction of the scientific mind to modify the philosophical, speculative and theoretical attitude



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towards the problems and activities of everyday life."

Let me mention one more change, namely, the tendency to emphasize the vocational aim of education, which is also a reaction against the traditional emphasis on spiritual culture. The old Chinese education paid little attention to the means of life. More importance was attached to the quality of life lived than to material self-preservation. Trade was held in far greater contempt by Chinese philosophers than ever it was in the West. Now this scale of values is being gradually overturned. Material efficiency is being considered as important as spiritual culture, or as a necessary basis for spiritual culture. This new emphasis on vocational training is manifested in the activities of the National Association for Vocational Education, in the important position given to vocational education in the new educational system, and in the fact that there were in 1924 no less than 1,353 schools in China giving vocational courses.

Thus far I have dwelt on the encouraging aspects of Chinese education. In so doing I am not blind to the fact that modern education in China is still in its infancy compared with Western standards, and great and perplexing problems are still waiting to be solved. One of the big problems

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in modern education is the introduction of compulsory education. According to the new educational system, compulsory education is temporarily limited to four years. In 1920 the Ministry of Education mapped out certain definite steps for the enforcement of compulsory education in accordance with which education is to be made universal by 1928. On account of political disturbances, these provisions have not been carried out. The province of Shansi, under its able governor, Yen Hsi-shan, has however enforced a most effective program of compulsory education. Although complete success has not been achieved, yet the latest statistics show that 72 per cent of the children of school age are now provided with education. This is, however, one of the few bright spots of educational advance in China, and the difficulties to be overcome are still tremendous. First, the expenditures for education have to be multiplied many fold, and this is not an easy task when the government is finding difficulty in meeting its present obligations. Second, a vast number of new schools have to be built and equipped. But the greatest difficulty lies in the training of the additional teachers that are needed to provide for universal education.

Roughly, China has about 40,000,000 children

mentary grades. But according to the latest returns, China has only 123,279 teachers, who are now serving the lower elementary schools. More than three times as many as the present number have to be added, in order to enforce a nation-wide compulsory education. There are now 43,846 students in normal schools and institutes which can turn out not more than 10,000 teachers every year as against the need of 770,000 teachers.

The removal of illiteracy is another serious educational problem in China. Deducting 120,000,000 children who are either below school age or belong to the sphere of compulsory education and 80,000,000 who have spent on an average of three years in the old-fashioned Chinese schools from the total population, there are about 200,000,000 illiterates constituting the problem for popular education to solve. The popular-education movement is now being pushed by the National Association for the Promotion of Popular Education, and is receiving nation-wide support. The course of study used consists of four readers, based on a vocabulary of the thousand most commonly used characters, known as "foundation characters." An ordinary

of the four months, he will be able to read newspapers, pamphlets, books, and correspondence based on this vocabulary, and he will be able to express himself by using the same. The four readers cost twelve cents (*Mex.*), which is about six cents in American money, so even the poorest can afford to pay for them.

There are three ways to learn the books. First, there is the "people's school," which has a teacher who meets his class regularly at definite periods of time. Second, there is the "people's reading circle," which takes the home, the store, etc., as units and encourages the literate in the home or in the store to teach his own illiterate members. Third, there is the "people's question station," where illiterates can stop and ask questions on any points in the books which they do not understand. With these means these readers have been introduced into homes, stores, factories, schools, churches, monasteries, offices, steamers, prisons, and armies. Within two years' time—in spite of flood, famine, and war—the circulation of these readers and other series have reached the two million mark. The readers are followed by series of booklets on various branches of knowledge. Supporters of the popular-

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education movement have adopted as their slogan, "the removal of illiteracy in this generation." This is one of the most hopeful signs of the day, for democracy cannot succeed in China as long as a large percentage of her people remains illiterate.

These are some of the big educational problems of China that are fraught with difficulties but are full of great possibilities for China's future. The encouraging aspect lies in the fact that these problems are being tackled with all seriousness, and a good beginning has already been made toward their solution; we know that "well begun is half done." Think what it will mean to China, and to the nations of the world, when her 200,000,000 illiterates shall have been educated and their wants increased!

There is left to be mentioned one more social tendency, namely, an awakened interest in the fight against corruption and other social evils. When the news was made known that bribery was resorted to in the election of Tsáo Kun to the presidency, there was condemnation on the part of intelligent people throughout the republic. The national conscience could not tolerate such a disgrace, and naturally there was great rejoicing when he was finally ousted from his office. Those members of the parliament who refused to be influenced

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by monetary considerations received in many instances great ovations from the people of their native provinces, and all were given seats in the recent Rehabilitation Conference as a recognition of their honesty and integrity. In the fall of last year the movement against opium was launched through the establishment of the National Anti-Opium Association, and so ready was the response that in the course of three months no less than seven hundred cities throughout the nation observed the national Anti-Opium Day, and two hundred and thirty centers had organized themselves for a fight against the planting of opium. The petition sent to the International Anti-Opium Conference at Geneva against the importation of opium, and to the Peking government against the planting of opium, was signed by more than two thousand organizations in different provinces, representing more than two million people. It is by such phenomena as this that one is led to the conviction that the moral sensitiveness of the Chinese people toward public corruption and evil is healthy and sound.

This general survey of the conditions in modern China has to be brought to an end. I have attempted in this inadequate review to point out some of the political, economic, and social tenden-



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cies in modern China. Although the treatment is general and cursory in character, I hope it is sufficient to show that China, as a republic, is still going through a period of transition and of readjustment; that she has been trying her best to meet the new situation and to solve the difficult problems confronting her; and that, notwithstanding the instability of the government, and in spite of internal unrest, she has made advancement in many phases of her national life. Indeed, all the great changes which happened in the West during the last four or five hundred years—political, economic, and social—are not only simultaneously taking place in China today but are influencing one another. True, not all change is progress; and with change there comes new danger. But certainly in these tremendous changes one can see great possibilities of China's future. She is now in a plastic stage. She has been brought face to face with new situations and new problems. She is no longer a nation of isolation and of mystery, but a nation with new ideals and new hopes as well as new aspirations.

What is her future destiny? What is to be the result of all the changes that are taking place today? And what will be its effect upon her civilization and upon the civilization of the West? These

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and other questions that might be raised are extremely interesting but most difficult to answer. One thing is certain, that is, Chinese people hold the firm conviction that, given sufficient time and freedom from interference, they will be able to overcome their present difficulties and come out victorious as a united and democratic nation.



## II

### CHINA'S POSITION IN EASTERN ASIA

Students of Chinese history are familiar with the fact that for many centuries China was the dominant power in Eastern Asia. Within the confines of her vast territory she rules with unquestioned authority. Her influence extended as far west as Aden and as far south as India while her boundaries in Central Asia touched the distant borders of Persia. She was, moreover, surrounded by many important dependencies whose rulers recognized her overlordship and sent her tribute as a token of their allegiance. In like manner, Chinese civilization was for many centuries the dominant culture of Asia and its influence was felt throughout the Eastern hemisphere. She sowed her seeds of culture among the Mongols and Manchus in the north; in Turkestan and Tibet to the west; in Burma, Annam, and Siam to the south; and in Korea and Japan to the east. During the T'ang and Ming dynasties, Japan, Korea, Siam, and other neighboring states sent students to China to receive education and special quarters were provided for them, and during the early part

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of the Manchu dynasty students from the Liu Cháu Islands and from Russia were admitted into the Chinese national university under specially designated Chinese professors.

But in less than three hundred years from the beginning of her intercourse with other nations, this great empire has been gradually eaten away at the fringes through the loss of her valuable dependencies: the Liu Cháu Islands to Japan in 1881; Tongkin and Annam to France in 1885; northern Burma to Great Britain in 1886, and Sikkim to the same in 1899; and Korea, Formosa, and the Pescadores to Japan in 1895. In addition, she has been forced to give away the so-called treaty rights and privileges which infringe upon her sovereignty, such as the deprivation of her tariff autonomy, the existence of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction, concessions and settlements, leased territories and treaty ports, spheres of influence and interest, the most-favored-nation clause as applied in China, as well as the existence of legation quarters and the stationing of legation guards, and the presence of foreign military and police forces under foreign command and until recently the establishment of foreign postal agencies. All these resulted in the loss of much of her former prestige and influence. Indeed, on more

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than one occasion the international rivalry in aggression in China became so serious that the very existence of China as a nation was threatened. The record of how all this happened forms a most pathetic tale in the history of China as well as an index of the international morality of modern nations.

Fortunately, through the bitter experience of humiliation and suffering China learned many valuable lessons which were responsible for the turning of the tide in her favor. She realized, among other things, that she must discard some of her former pride and self-sufficiency which were partly responsible for her growing weakness, and that she must learn lessons from the West, as did Japan, her next neighbor. Thus convinced of the necessity for change, she began to introduce reforms in her government. She organized a modern educational system. Instead of receiving students from other countries she began to send her own students abroad to study in Japan, Germany, France, England, and the United States.

These early efforts at reform soon began to bear fruit. Great changes—political, social, and intellectual—began to take place. The most significant result was the birth of a new patriotism or the growth of a new nationalism, which found expres-



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sion in the successful throwing off of the yoke of the old régime and in the determination of her people to permit no further infringement upon China's political sovereignty and territorial integrity. At a most critical time of her history the United States also came to her rescue by the enunciation of the principle of the open door and equal opportunity, which proved to be an effective check upon the encroachments of the aggressive nations.

Since China became a republic, and particularly since the close of the European war, a change of policy on the part of the treaty powers toward China has taken place. Instead of competing with one another at the expense of China they have once more adopted the so-called co-operative policy in their dealings with her, manifested in the conclusion of the reorganization loan in 1913, in the formation of the international banking consortium in 1920, and in the holding of the Washington Conference in 1921-22. These factors, together with the fact that China has entered into a new relationship with Germany and the Soviet Republic, promise to give China a new international status not only in Asia but also in the family of nations.

In this lecture we are not to deal with China's international relationship as a whole but rather to

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confine ourselves to a brief examination of her relationship with Russia, Japan, and Great Britain with reference to Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet, and of the present crisis in China as affecting her future position in Eastern Asia.

A study of the eastward expansion of Russia reveals the fact that the Russians made their appearance on the Manchurian plain as early as the middle of the seventeenth century. During the two hundred years following, repeated advances were made by the Russians, who were in turn pushed back by the Manchus. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the Russian government had become so seriously concerned over the desire for territorial expansion that it made repeated attempts upon one excuse or another to secure the cession of Manchuria from the Chinese government, but failed. However, during China's second war with Great Britain and France (1857-60), Russia, taking advantage of the situation, succeeded in securing the recognition from China of the northern bank of the Amur River as Russian territory and the cession of the territory east of the Ussuri River, including the maritime province.

Later (1896), through the pretense of the formation of a defensive alliance against Japan, Russia secured from China the right to build a railway

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through Manchuria toward Vladivostok, making possible the necessary connection between Eastern Asia and European Russia. It turned out that this represented only the beginning of her program of territorial expansion in North China. During and after the Boxer uprising her troops occupied Manchuria and Russia, posing once more as a friend, entered into a separate convention with the Manchu general in Mukden, restricting the sovereign right of China in Manchuria, and demanding the concession of its economic development, virtually making Manchuria a Russian protectorate. All these demands China resisted, and Great Britain, Japan, and the United States entered vigorous protests. In 1902 we witness the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which for a time appeared to be an effective check upon Russian advance in Manchuria, for by the treaty of 1902 Russia promised to complete the evacuation of Manchuria in three successive periods of six months each. But instead of carrying out her promise, she demanded from China the non-alienation of Manchuria and the closing of Manchuria against the economic enterprise of any other nation but Russia, and sent troops into Korea, thus threatening the safety of Korea and Japan.

Here Japan appeared on the scene and demand-

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ed a mutual understanding to respect the integrity of China and Korea, and the reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating influence in Korea and Russia's special influence in Manchuria. Russia was willing to concede to Japan the recognition of her preponderance in Korea, but she insisted on Japan's recognition of Manchuria as being outside her sphere of influence, and refused to give the pledge to respect the integrity of China in Manchuria. The Russo-Japanese War that ensued resulted, among other things, in the transference to Japan of the southern section of the Russian Manchurian Railway, thus putting an effective check upon Russian advance in Manchuria.

Turning now to Mongolia, we find that Russia's interest in that region found its earliest expression in the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1881), which gave the Russians the right to trade in Mongolia free from payment of duties. During the period of the international struggle for concessions, Russia claimed Mongolia and Manchuria as belonging to her sphere of influence. After her great loss in Manchuria she tried to better her position in Mongolia. In 1911 Russia encouraged outer Mongolia to declare her independence of China. Between 1911 and 1915 Russia concluded various conventions with outer Mongolia and China

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through which she practically established her joint suzerainty over outer Mongolia and made it a buffer state between China and herself.

With the passing of the tsar's régime China reasserted her authority and succeeded in 1917 in compelling outer Mongolia to rescind her declaration of autonomy. Meanwhile, the new Soviet government adopted a policy toward China fundamentally different from that of the old régime. In the summer of 1919 and 1920 the Soviet government seeking recognition from China, made various declarations and offers favorable to China. To these offers China made no answer, having as yet not recognized soviet Russia; but taking this opportunity, China terminated all official relations with the old régime and made herself the temporary trustee of Russian interests in China, pending the establishment of a national government in Russia. While all this was taking place, Baron Ungern von Sternberg, leader of a band of the Whites who were hard pressed by the Reds, conveniently descended with his men upon outer Mongolia, and as relief columns sent by the Chinese government did not reach there in time, took Urga in February, 1921. At this juncture the Reds intervened, occupied it in turn against Chinese protests,

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and gave encouragement to the setting up of the people's revolutionary government.

In the meantime, soviet Russia did not cease to approach China for the restoration of normal relations. Between 1920 and 1922 no less than three different missions were sent out but brought no result, the chief obstacle being their unwillingness to discuss the Mongolian question. Finally, M. L. Karakhan became the head of the Soviet mission, and succeeded after several months of discussion with the representatives of the Chinese government in signing the treaty of May 31, 1924, which gave formal recognition to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and provided for the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries. In this new treaty the soviet government renounced all special rights and privileges in relation to concessions which had been acquired by the tsar's government in any part of China; it relinquished the rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction; it renounced the Russian share of the Boxer indemnity; it recognized outer Mongolia as an integral part of China, respected China's sovereignty therein, and agreed to withdraw its troops from that region. The two governments agreed that treaties concluded between the tsar's govern-



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ment and other countries whereby the sovereign rights or interests of China are affected are null and void; they pledged that henceforth neither should conclude any treaties or agreements which would prejudice the sovereign rights or interests of the other, and that all new treaties would be made on a basis of equality, reciprocity, and justice. It was further agreed that the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway should be settled in accordance with principles laid down, among which were the provisions that the railway was to be considered a purely commercial enterprise; that, with the exception of matters pertaining to the business operations which are under the direct control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, all other matters affecting the rights of the national and the local governments of the republic of China, such as judicial matters, matters relating to civil administration, military administration, police, municipal government, taxation, and landed property, shall be administered by the Chinese authorities; that the Soviet republic agrees to the redemption by the Chinese government with Chinese capital of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and that the future of the railway shall be determined by the two countries to the exclusion of any third party or parties.

Since the signing of the treaty the Soviet gov-

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ernment has shown good faith in withdrawing from outer Mongolia all her troops without waiting for the final arrangements to be adopted by the special conference provided by the treaty. Thus the Sino-Russian relationship has been put upon a new basis, but it remains to be seen whether the recent action of the soviet republic is merely a stroke of diplomacy or the embodiment of a sincere desire to live up to the high ideals which she professes.

Meanwhile, soviet Russia once more comes forward proclaiming herself as China's best friend, and is being regarded as such by many Chinese people, not because they are in sympathy with her radical views, but because she has given up her old treaty rights which infringed upon China's integrity. True it is that since the European war Germany has also concluded a treaty with China on the basis of equality and reciprocity, and that she no longer enjoys the privileges which the other treaty powers still enjoy; but Germany gave up her rights because she was obliged to, for by the Treaty of Versailles the German government renounced all former German rights, titles, and privileges in China. In the case of the Soviet republic, she surrendered all her former treaty rights voluntarily (which action is naturally deeply appreciated by the Chinese people).

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Having completed our survey of Russia's relationship with China as affecting her position in Eastern Asia, we now pass on to the study of Japan's interest in Manchuria and Mongolia. We have noted that before the Russo-Japanese War Japan in conjunction with Great Britain and the United States made repeated protests against Russian aggression in Manchuria and that, in the negotiations with Russia just before the declaration of war, Japan insisted on the integrity of China in Manchuria, the observance of which Russia repeatedly refused to pledge. Had Japan continued in this policy China would have recognized her as a big sister, and how different would have been the relationship between these two nations!

Unfortunately, after the victories of war the policy of Japan toward China took a radical change. By virtue of the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), she obtained from Russia the transfer of the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan and the cession of the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway with the adjoining mines. Possessed of these railways and mining interests, the Japanese government organized the South Manchurian Railway Company, which has been a strong factor in exploiting the economic resources of that region. By subsequent treaties and exchanges of notes, Japan

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secured various other important concessions and has dominated south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia with strategic lines of railways. By virtue of Article 6 of the original grant to Russia, which was transferred to Japan after the war, although the original grant was qualified by special provisions for the protection and preservation of Chinese sovereignty, she has exercised actual sovereignty over the railway zone of 70.54 square miles, permitting no Chinese soldiers and police to enter without permit and maintaining exclusive police and military guards of her own. Moreover, she has established Japanese settlements along the railway under Japanese jurisdiction and sovereignty.

Not content with the advances already made in Manchuria, Japan, taking advantage of the fact that the Western nations were busily engaged in the European war, made the bold attempt in 1915 by means of the now famous Twenty-one Demands, to capture the sovereignty of south Manchuria and eastern Mongolia and even to threaten the independence of China. The final treaties and notes signed between China and Japan on May 25, 1915, although falling short of her original demands, nevertheless represent another advanced step taken in tightening her hold upon south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia. The terms of

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the concessions of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway as well as the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny were extended to ninety-nine years. Additional suitable places were to be opened in eastern inner Mongolia as commercial ports. The floating of loans for the construction of railways in south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia and of general loans on the security of taxes in the same region must first be offered to the Japanese. If foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters should be employed in south Manchuria, the Japanese were to have preferential rights. Finally, the Japanese subjects in south Manchuria were to have the right to lease land by negotiation, such leases being understood to imply a long-term lease of not more than thirty years and also the possibility of their unconditional renewal.

This by no means ended Japan's advance toward the further control of south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia, for a year later came the conflict between the Chinese and the Japanese soldiers in Chengchiatun over a trifling affair. Seizing this opportunity, Japan demanded that China agree to the stationing of Japanese police officers in south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia, and that Chinese military cadet schools employ a

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certain number of Japanese officers as instructors. These demands the Chinese people resisted with all their might. Meanwhile, the Okuma cabinet, which had engineered the Twenty-one Demands and also those for the Chengchiatun incident, suffered severe popular censure for the mishandling of Chinese relations and was compelled to yield to the Terauchi cabinet, which adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward China, and the case was settled without concession.

It is necessary to pause here for a moment to examine a few of the fundamental reasons which have been used to justify Japan's advance in Manchuria. We are told over and over again that Japan needs an outlet for her excess population and that Manchuria is the natural outlet. Granting this to be true, it is necessary to remember that China, also, has a crowded population; that Manchuria is a natural outlet more truly for her than for Japan; and that, so far as rights to this territory are concerned, China has the better claim, in view of recognized ownership and occupation thereof for many centuries. Moreover, Japan has unused land within her own confines sufficient to support the growing population for the next half-century, besides, she holds Formosa, Korea, and south Saghalien which offer further opportunities for expan-



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sion. It is also said that Japan has a special claim to Manchuria inasmuch as she made a great sacrifice in the Russo-Japanese War to preserve the integrity of Manchuria. But one should recall that Japan fought the war, not for the preservation of Manchuria, but rather for her own self-preservation. Moreover, she has been more than fully compensated for her sacrifice in the form of economic concessions in these regions already granted by China. But to entertain designs in these regions for other than commercial and industrial expansion, as she attempted to do through the Twenty-one Demands and on other occasions, would be to do the very thing against which she waged war with Russia, namely, to infringe upon the integrity not only of Manchuria, but of China as a whole. Such a course Japan cannot afford to take since her own national existence depends largely upon China, and since she repeatedly has announced to the world that she will not violate the political and territorial integrity of China and will observe the principles of the open door and equal opportunity.

Meanwhile, important events brought about by the end of the European war together with political changes both in China and Japan have caused the Japanese government to change its foreign policy.

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In response to the Chinese agitation for the abrogation of the Twenty-one Demands, or the treaty of May 25, 1915, Japan made three concessions: first, she threw open to the new international banking consortium the right, previously held exclusively by Japanese capital, of granting loans for the construction of railways in south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia and other loans secured on taxes in that region; second, she yielded her preferential right concerning the engagement by China of Japanese advisers or instructors in political, financial, or military matters in south Manchuria; third, she withdrew the reservation to Group 5 of the Twenty-one Demands according to which they had been postponed for future discussion.

By the treaty of the special conference collateral with the Washington Conference and by a subsequent conference, Japan restored Kiaochow to China and settled all the problems related to the long-disputed Shantung question, thus removing a cause for future war in the Far East and a sore spot in Sino-Japanese relationships. Furthermore, in the Nine Power Treaty of the Washington Conference, respecting policies and principles in relation to China, Japan, together with other powers, pledged herself to respect the sovereignty, the

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independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."

This new policy of Japan toward China can also be read between the lines of the speech of Japan's Foreign Minister at the opening of the last session of the Diet. In this speech, Baron Shidehara tells the world that Japan intends to safeguard her rightful position in China, particularly her rights and interests in south Manchuria and Mongolia, but she has no aggressive or territorial designs of any kind in that or in any other part of China. He reiterates the oft-repeated principle of non-interference in China's internal politics, which, if followed strictly by Japan and other powers, would give China the necessary freedom to solve her problems in her own way. The speech embodies a declaration of faith, hope, and sympathy with the Chinese people in their present trouble and an assurance that Japan will accept no plan to place the Chinese railways and other administrative organs under international control, thereby further infringing upon the sovereignty of the Chinese nation. The general tone of this message is quite in keeping with the spirit of the Washington Conference, and it remains for Japan to live up to her professions, for in international intercourse between nations as between individuals actions speak louder than words.

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Judging from what has been said, the future Sino-Japanese relationship, however affected it may be temporarily by the recent unfortunate happenings in China, is destined to become more cordial as soon as the causes of the present friction are removed and questions over south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia are satisfactorily settled. The policy of Japan, as we have noticed, is decidedly conciliatory and friendly, as she is anxious to overcome the Chinese resentment at the Twenty-one Demands and other actions of her military régime and to pave the way for closer economic and cultural relationships. All thinking Chinese and Japanese realize that China and Japan are closely interwoven in interest, and that in their future destiny they should sustain cordial relationships one with the other for their own interest as well as for the interest of the world. Indeed, since the settlement of the Shantung question and until the outbreak of the recent trouble their relationship had been greatly improved. But the fact that Germany and soviet Russia have renounced their former treaty rights and privileges and entered into new treaties with China on the basis of equality, reciprocity, and justice has placed Japan and other treaty powers not yet ready to take the same step in a somewhat unfavorable light by com-

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parison, for both Germany and Russia in losing their old treaty rights and privileges have attained a specially favorable position. America gave up a portion of her Boxer indemnity and won the good will of China which money cannot buy. "He who loses his life shall find it" is a principle which holds true in international relationships as well as in religious and spiritual life.

Let us turn now our thoughts for a moment to Anglo-Chinese relationships with reference to Tibet, a territory rich in gold and other mineral resources. It is a well-known fact that British interest in the possibilities of trade with Tibet began as early as the middle of the nineteenth century. After various attempts to get that trade started, a Sino-British agreement was signed at Chefoo in 1876 which was the first British recognition of Chinese authority in Tibet. By various subsequent agreements the right of the British to carry on trade with Tibet was definitely authorized by China, though it was limited to certain specified towns. By the beginning of the twentieth century a new situation had arisen. The Tibetan authorities at Lhasa in their attempt to thwart the British had turned to the Russians for support in anti-British efforts. Russia was entirely willing to help the Tibetans because such help gave a chance for

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further expansion and especially for a thrust down into India. Since then British advances in Tibet have been influenced by two considerations: to secure the right to trade and develop the resources of Tibet and to protect India from Russian aggression.

In 1903 Great Britain, under strong opposition from the Tibetans, sent an expedition to Tibet, under the command of Colonel Younghusband and entered into a direct treaty with Tibet which virtually created a British protectorate over Tibet and secured for Britain an equal voice with China in the management of Tibetan affairs. The extent of the domination over Tibetan affairs which the British intended to set up is made clear in Article IX:

*a)* No portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power;

*b)* No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs;

*c)* No Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet;

*d)* No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights shall be granted to any Foreign Power or to the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;



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e) No Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power.<sup>1</sup>

In 1906 Great Britain entered into another agreement with China by which Great Britain secured the right to construct telegraph lines connecting India with the trade markets provided for and promised not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet, while China undertook not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet. Thus from Tibet and China, Great Britain secured agreements enabling her to trade in Tibet and guaranteeing her against Russian aggression through Tibet. A year later Great Britain entered into a direct agreement with Russia in which the two powers pledged themselves to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet, to abstain from all interference in its administration, and to enter into no negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese government. And in 1908 a tripartite conference was held in Calcutta which resulted in the signing by Chinese, Tibetan, and British representatives of a new agreement which is the last formally ratified agreement between China and any foreign power

<sup>1</sup> Sir F. Younghusband, *India and Tibet* (London, 1910), p. 442.

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dealing with Tibetan affairs, and which nominally at least is still in force. Since then Great Britain has made repeated attempts to strengthen further her hold over Tibet. In 1913, through the conference at Simla, she attempted to put herself in the position of a protector in Tibet. In 1917 she presented twelve demands concerning Tibet similar to the spirit of the Twenty-one Demands of Japan. All of these demands China has persistently refused to consider.

Briefly put, the Anglo-Chinese relationship over Tibet as it stands today is as follows: Thus far China has never given up her sovereign right over Tibet, whose inhabitants constitute one of the five races which make up the Chinese republic of the present day. Tibet has been represented in the Chinese parliament, in the recent Rehabilitation Conference, and will be represented during the coming Citizens' Conference. In fact, Chinese suzerainty over Tibet has been formally recognized by the Tibetans and by all others. What China desires about Tibet is the continued recognition of Tibet as a part of China and the assurance that no foreign power will ever seek to take a part of Tibetan territory or to interfere in Tibetan affairs.

On the other hand, Great Britain, through the

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various treaties and agreements she has made with Tibet and China, has now a strong hold upon Tibet. Some of the steps taken in recent years have led Chinese to believe that Great Britain still entertains designs for the final annexation of Tibet. British official statements, however, claim that all Great Britain desires is peace along the border and opportunity to trade. It is to be hoped that such official statements are true, and that, in view of Russia's changing policy toward Mongolia, of the present patriotic and nationalistic uprising in China and of Great Britain's own commitments at the Washington Conference, the strong sense of justice and fair play of which the British people are proud will assert itself and bring its influence to bear upon their government so that from now on it will adopt a less aggressive and more democratic policy toward Tibet and toward China.

The treatment of this subject will not be complete without reference to the recent uprising in China because it has a very intimate bearing upon China's relations with other nations. The origin of the disturbance can be traced to the movement to improve labor conditions in China. It is a well-known fact that working conditions in many of the mills and factories in Shanghai and other cities are far from satisfactory. Working hours are often too

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long; the environment is often unsanitary; and wages are frequently too low. There is a movement to improve these conditions in the hope that the modern industrial era may be ushered in with the maximum of benefit and the minimum of suffering. Naturally, the laboring class is most intimately concerned, and as in other countries they have organized labor unions and found out that the calling of a strike is one of the effective means of getting results, especially when they fail to secure them through peaceful means. In the present case it is the Japanese cotton mills that are concerned. For some time the workmen of a Japanese cotton mill in Shanghai have been working for better conditions, and on failing to make much headway they called a strike. The Japanese authorities were inclined to take stringent measures to suppress the strike, measures which resulted in the killing of a workman and the wounding of others. The students, deeply interested in the movement to improve labor conditions, felt sympathy toward the strikers and together with them organized a peaceful demonstration to show their sympathy and to lodge their protest against the killing of strikers. The police interfered and a conflict ensued. In obedience to the order of a British constable, the police fired, killing and wounding many innocent

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and unarmed students and laborers. Since this unfortunate occurrence the Chinese government has entered a number of protests with the foreign legations concerned, but so far the latter have refused to acknowledge the responsibility of the municipal council for the deplorable act and have been trying to shift it on to the shoulders of the unarmed Chinese, claiming that the action was taken when the safety of the police was being threatened. In consequence, a deep feeling of resentment now prevails among the Chinese people and the situation is fraught with grave dangers.

While the present uprising originated in the attempt to improve labor conditions, the killing of unarmed Chinese has opened up the wound of a long-standing discontent against the Shanghai municipal council. Shanghai is one of the treaty ports of China in which there are two concessions, one French and the other international. The international settlement is controlled by the municipal council with two Americans, one Japanese, and six British representatives, elected by foreign taxpayers in the settlement. It claims to be the supreme administrative authority in this area, the supreme administrative authority in this area, which was originally set apart by the Chinese government merely for foreign merchants to reside in,

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and it actually exercises unrestricted police jurisdiction therein without the sanction of treaties. Even in judicial administration the municipal council has assumed unlawful control. Where foreigners commit an offense or are sued they are of course tried before the courts of their own representatives in China, but when Chinese citizens are defendants they are tried before the so-called "Mixed Court," which was originally a Chinese court but which has been seized by the foreign consuls at Shanghai since the revolution of 1911, and of which the judges are now appointed by the foreign municipal council. The Chinese residents within the area contribute the main portion of its revenue by paying more than 70 per cent of the taxes. They are denied the right of vote at the election of council members or any voice in the enactment of the laws and rules of the settlement. For many years the Chinese fought for the right of representation but obtained no result. Three years ago the fight was renewed with vigor and resulted in the creation of a board of Chinese advisers, but it is a more or less nominal body. While foreign children in the settlement are practically all provided with education, the facilities for the education of Chinese are far from being adequate. The council maintains a number of public parks which



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refuse admission to the Chinese residents although they pay taxes for their upkeep.

This discontent against the administration of the Municipal Council has led to a still larger issue. Believing that the mere settlement of this particular incident will not suffice to improve the situation and that in order to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents and to place the relations of the Chinese people and foreign residents in China on a more stable and satisfactory basis a more satisfactory solution is needed, the former are asking for a fundamental revision of the existing treaties between China and the foreign powers which made possible the recent unhappy occurrence and which have been the cause of much friction between China and foreign nations.

Inasmuch as the question at issue represents one of the burning questions of contemporary international politics in the Far East, it is necessary that we give the matter a little more careful consideration. The existing treaties between China and foreign nations with the exception of the new treaties with Germany and the Soviet republic were not contracted on a basis of equality. They were made long ago, mostly as the price of defeat and under circumstances that did not permit free discussion, and were based upon nothing better or

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higher than the traditional policy of exploitation of the weak nations. Under these treaties the foreign nations enjoy certain privileges and rights which infringe upon China's integrity, restrict the exercise of her sovereignty, and obstruct her fullest development. China believes that the time has now come for a fundamental revision of these treaties. Most of the conditions obtaining when they were negotiated do not exist now. The times in China have changed and the standard of general enlightenment is considerably higher than in former days. The educated classes today cherish with no less fervor than the peoples of the West the fundamental principles of government and of international relationship. They now understand the meaning of the numerous treaties, by which China is bound and her freedom of action restricted.

In a recent note sent to the foreign diplomatic corps in Peking the Chinese government declared that at the time China entered the world-war with the Allies she was encouraged to hope for a definite improvement of her international status. Great, therefore, must be the disappointment of the Chinese people when, after the Great War for a common cause has been won, China's own status remains unimproved, and in some respects inferior to that of the defeated nations, for in none of the

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defeated nations do we find the existence of extra-territorial courts, concessions, leased territories, and externally imposed tariffs. It is feared that worse tragedy may result if the powers concerned ignore this reasonable and legitimate aspiration of the Chinese people and turn a deaf ear to their earnest request for a readjustment of China's treaty relations on an equitable basis. On the other hand, we are convinced that the relations of all nations with China can be made more cordial and their rights and interests can be advanced without rather than with the enjoyment of all the extraordinary privileges and immunities given the foreign powers by existing treaties with China.

It is necessary to point out that while the agitation for the fundamental revision of the so-called "unequal treaties" is being given a new impetus by the recent disturbance in China and by the new treaties with Germany and with soviet Russia, it is by no means a new movement but rather a policy adopted long ago by China in her relationship with other nations. During the early years of the present century, and in her treaties with Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, China made known her determination to reform her judicial system, looking toward the relinquishment of extraterritoriality on the part of these powers. In

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1919 she announced her claims for the recovery of impaired rights at the Peace Conference at Versailles, but they received no consideration. In 1921 she made similar claims at the Washington Conference, and this time with some success. In our study of China's relations with the United States we shall have occasion to observe that the treaty powers concerned have removed certain restrictions placed upon China and have further promised to remove others upon her fulfilment of certain conditions considered by them to be necessary, though their commitments have not all been carried out; neither are the changes effected fundamental enough to satisfy the cherished wishes of the Chinese people.

Dr. Schurman, the former American minister to China, favors the so-called evolutionary method of treaty revision, involving co-operation with the treaty powers in the direction of a gradual revision of the treaties as provided in the Washington Conference commitments. Karakhan, the soviet ambassador to China, advocates the revolutionary method of disposing of the unequal treaties, involving the radical abrogation of the existing treaties and the creation of new ones, as has been done in the case of Germany and the soviet republic. China is not particular about the exact method to

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be used but she does insist that some definite steps be taken soon looking toward the realization of her legitimate aspirations.

It is encouraging to note that Senator Borah, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, in a recent message to China declares that he favors the withdrawal of extraterritorial rights in China as speedily as practicable and the adoption of a policy by all which would respect the territorial integrity and national rights of China. And it must be a source of satisfaction and encouragement to the Chinese people to learn the good news that the United States is in favor of the calling of a special conference to consider the question of treaty revision and other questions concerning China now pressing for immediate solution. Let us hope that the proposed conference will be held soon, and that, as a result, a satisfactory solution may be found and the relations of other nations with China be more cordial and friendly than in days gone by.

### III

## CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

In studying China's relations with the United States we come to the brightest chapter in the history of China's foreign relations. The intercourse between these two nations, covering a period of one hundred and forty years, has been characterized by a sustained feeling of friendship and cordiality. Ever since her first contact with China, America has endeavored to practice the highest ideals of justice and righteousness. Of all the treaty powers having relations with China, she alone has never taken advantage of China's military weakness and reaped benefits from it to satisfy her own ambitions. She has never waged any real war with China, and is the only nation which does not possess any territorial concessions, not even in the treaty ports. On the other hand, she has always stood for the political and territorial integrity of China and equal opportunity in trade and commerce. In the settlement of the Boxer uprising she used her influence in the interest of justice and moderation, succeeded in urging the powers to re-



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duce the amount of indemnity demanded from China, later returned to China a handsome portion of that indemnity for the promotion of educational and cultural enterprises, and has influenced other nations to take the same step. After the European war she further used her good offices in calling the Washington Conference, which made possible the settlement of the long-disputed Shantung question and the adoption of measures calculated for the benefit of China. She may have taken some steps the wisdom of which is questionable, but it cannot be denied that, on the whole, America in her dealings with China has played fair, and has tried her best to maintain the high ideals of international relationship.

On the other hand, the Chinese people have always entertained a very kindly feeling toward America, and stand ready to reciprocate her acts of friendship whenever they have an opportunity. During the Chinese Taiping Rebellion, which occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century, an American citizen by the name of Frederick Townsend Ward, of Salem, Massachusetts, rendered significant service in the suppression of that rebellion, and upon his untimely death the Chinese government gave him posthumous promotion in military rank and a temple was erected to his

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memory in which sacrifices are regularly offered at the altar to his departed spirit as an appreciation of his willingness to lay down his life for the welfare of a country not his own.

In appreciation of the good will and sincerity of one of the early American ministers to China, Anson Burlingame, the Chinese government appointed him, in 1868, head of the first Chinese diplomatic mission to the nations of the West, an honor which China never before or since has given to a foreign national. Previous to his acceptance of this post, Minister Burlingame was reported to have written to the American secretary of state to the effect:

When the oldest nation in the world, containing one-third of the human race, asks for the first time to come into relations with the West and requests the youngest nation through its representative to act as a medium of such a change, the mission is one not to be solicited or rejected.

In 1908 the Chinese government, upon receipt of the news that the American government had decided to return to China a portion of the Boxer indemnity, immediately made the decision, as an expression of appreciation, to use the money so returned for the establishment and maintenance of Tsinghua College and for sending her youths to study in American colleges and universities.

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With this general historical background, we are perhaps somewhat ready to proceed to the examination of some of the relations between these two countries. For the sake of clearness, we shall consider them under three heads—political, economic, and cultural. No one of these heads, of course, can be considered in isolation because each is intimately bound up with the other two, but some advantage may be derived from treating them one by one.

In any attempt to study the political relationship between these two countries it is necessary to understand, first of all, the American policy which has guided her action in China, known as the “open-door” policy—its origin and its significance. It is to be recalled that following the Sino-Japanese War, which revealed to the world the military incompetency of China, there followed a period during which the various treaty powers struggled for concessions and carved out for themselves various spheres of influence, thus threatening the very sovereignty and integrity of China. In order to prevent further aggravation of the serious situation and for fear that the tendency if unchecked might lead to the dismemberment of China, John Hay in 1899 exchanged notes with England, Germany, Russia, France, Italy, and

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Japan, in which he advocated the doctrine of equal opportunity for trade and commerce in China. To this all the powers addressed, except Russia, who made a more or less indefinite reply, gave their assent. In 1900, when the Boxer uprising once more imperiled the integrity of China, John Hay re-affirmed the principle of the open-door policy, but this time he proclaimed openly that the United States policy in China was not only to maintain the equal opportunity of trade but also to preserve the integrity of China.

The spirit of this policy, however, had been adopted by America from the beginning of her intercourse with China. As early as 1842, after the conclusion of peace at Nanking, Admiral Kearney, of the American squadron, then visiting Canton, induced the viceroy of the two southern provinces to memorialize the throne, that America be placed on the same footing as England with respect to the advantages of that treaty. The request was complied with in the first American treaty with China, known as the Cushing Treaty of 1844. Indeed, China on this occasion showed her magnanimity and breadth of view by throwing open the five treaty ports to all nations alike. Burlingame had the same idea in mind when he declared that his government was opposed to any policy of spoli-

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ation toward China, and called the attention of foreigners to the grave dangers attending illegal attempts to exploit China for selfish aims. Tyler Dennett, in his book entitled *Americans in Eastern Asia*, says that in the nineteenth century the issue in American policy in Asia was not the open door; that was never a question. The real issue was whether the United States should follow an isolated or a co-operative policy to make sure of the open door.

Such being the case, one is led to raise the question: Why is it that such an important policy was never a question in America and at the same time it was welcomed by China and readily accepted by other treaty powers though not followed strictly and consistently? To my mind the answer can be easily stated. The policy, being a liberal one, works for the best interests of all parties concerned. Through this policy China has the assurance that her territorial integrity will be preserved. Through this policy America secures open access to all parts of China for trade and commerce and for the investment of capital on a basis of equality with other nations. She has everything to gain and nothing to lose. And through the general adoption of this policy the nations of the world are saved from the necessity of setting up spheres of influ-

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ence and other barriers against one another and from cutting one another's throats.

Since the European war China and America have been brought closer together by the Washington Conference. The holding of the Washington Conference, while it was not primarily for the consideration of problems of China, did give her an opportunity to present her case. While China did not get all she wished to obtain, the powers represented at the Conference did make a number of significant commitments, which if carried out, would work for the benefit of China.

The nine powers represented at the Conference concluded a treaty with a view to increasing the customs revenues of the Chinese government, according to which China was to have an immediate revision of tariff valuations so as to be able to collect an effective 5 per cent upon her imports. And by means of steps to be arranged by a special conference she was to be allowed to levy a surtax of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent ad valorem and a further surtax on luxuries not to exceed 5 per cent ad valorem. Also, when the work of the special conference is completed and the abolition of *likin* is effected, she is to be allowed to raise her import tariff to  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent ad valorem. Since the closing of the Washington Conference the revision of the tariff to an effective



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5 per cent has been duly made and carried out, but the special conference which was to make arrangements for the levying of a surtax has failed to meet, owing to the fact that France demanded of China the settlement of the Gold Franc case as a condition to her ratification of the treaty, although she was not supposed to make any ulterior demand and America could have demanded her immediate ratification as was the case with the Four Power Treaty.

The effect of this long delay has been to keep back the development of commerce and industry, which is partly responsible for China's failure to meet some of her financial obligations. Both China and America have suffered loss. It is therefore pleasant to record that the long-disputed Gold Franc case between China and France is settled and the way is now open for the calling of the special conference provided for by the Nine Power Treaty.

The Chinese delegation in assenting to the treaty of tariff revision did not relinquish their claim for the restoration of complete tariff autonomy for which they fought throughout the Washington Conference. Their position is that tariff autonomy is a sovereign right enjoyed by all independent states. Its free exercises is essential to

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the well-being of the state. The existing treaty provisions by which the levy of customs duties, transit dues, and other imports is regulated constitute not only a restriction upon China's freedom of action but an infringement upon her sovereignty. It was therefore somewhat of an anomaly that the Washington Conference, after declaring that it recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, should refuse to restore to China tariff autonomy, which is a part of her sovereignty.

The representatives of the powers at the Washington Conference also passed a resolution to establish a commission within three months after the adjournment of the Conference to inquire into the present practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China and into the laws and methods of the judicial administration of China, with a view to reporting within one year to the governments of the powers their findings of facts in regard to these matters and their recommendations as to what means they may find suitable to improve and assist the efforts of the Chinese government to effect such legislation and judicial reforms as would warrant the powers in relinquishing, either progressively or otherwise, their respective rights of extraterritoriality. Since then China has asked for an extension of time of

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one year, to enable her to make the necessary preparation, but three long years have now passed by and no action has been taken to carry out this important resolution, the chief reason being the objection raised by France. Meanwhile, the Chinese people are becoming impatient of waiting and are making insistent demands for the early relinquishment of this special right, believing as they do that the reforms already made in Chinese law and the arrangements for their administration justify their expectations.

Inasmuch as the question of the removal of extraterritoriality has become the burning question in contemporary international politics, it seems necessary that we give the matter a little further consideration. During the Washington Conference China's wishes with regard to the modification and ultimate abolition of the extraterritorial rights of foreigners within her borders were presented by Dr. C. H. Wang, one of the well-known Chinese experts in international law, who received his education both in America and in Great Britain. Extraterritoriality in China, said Dr. Wang, dated back almost to the beginning of China's treaty relations with foreign countries. It was clearly laid down in the treaty of 1844 between the United States and

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China, and similar provisions had since been inserted in treaties with other powers.<sup>1</sup>

These extraterritorial rights were granted at a time when there were only five treaty ports, that is, places where foreigners could trade and reside. Now there are fifty such places and an equal number of places opened to foreign trade upon China's initiative. This means an ever increasing number of persons within China's territory over whom she was almost powerless. The anomalous condition had become a serious problem with which local administration was confronted, and if the impairment of the territorial and administrative integrity of China was not to be continued the matter demanded immediate solution.

Some of the serious objections to the extraterritorial system that were pointed out are as follows:

a) In the first place, it is a derogation of China's sovereign rights, and is regarded by the Chinese people as a national humiliation.

b) There is a multiplicity of courts in one and the same locality, and the interrelation of such

<sup>1</sup> The views of Dr. Wang on extraterritoriality are quoted or paraphrased from United States Senate Document by Willoughby in his *China of the Conference*, pp. 114-16.

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courts has given rise to a legal situation perplexing both to the trained lawyer and to the layman.

c) Disadvantages arise from the uncertainty of the law. The general rule is that the law to be applied in a given case is the law of the defendant's nationality, and so, in a commercial transaction between, say X and Y of different nationalities, the rights and liabilities of the parties vary according as to whether X sued Y first, or Y sued X first.

d) When causes of action, civil or criminal, arise in which foreigners are defendants it is necessary for adjudication that they should be carried to the nearest consular court, which may be many miles away; and so it often happens that it is practically impossible to obtain the attendance of the necessary witnesses or to produce other necessary evidence.

e) Finally, it is a further disadvantage to the Chinese that foreigners in China under cover of extraterritoriality claim immunity from local taxes and excises which the Chinese themselves are required to pay. Sir Robert Hart, who worked and lived in China for many years, has said in his book, *"These from the Land of Sinim"*:

The extraterritoriality stipulation may have relieved the native official of some troublesome duties but it has always been felt to be offensive and humiliating and has ever a dis-

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integrating effect, leading the people, on the one hand, to despise their own government and officials, and, on the other, to envy and dislike the foreigner withdrawn from native control.

Until the system is abolished or substantially modified, Dr. Wang explained, it would be inexpedient for China to open her entire territory to foreign trade and commerce. The evils of the existing system had been so obvious that Great Britain in 1902, the United States and Japan in 1903, and Sweden in 1908 agreed to relinquish extraterritoriality rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations warranted them in so doing. More than twenty years had elapsed since the conclusion of those treaties and while it is a matter of opinion as to whether or not the state of China's laws has attained the standard to which she is expected to conform it is impossible to deny that she has made great progress on the path of legal reform. A few facts would suffice for the present. A law codification commission for the compilation and revision of laws has been sitting since 1904. Five codes have been prepared, some of which have already been put into force: (*a*) the civil code, still in course of revision; (*b*) the criminal code, in force since 1912; (*c*) the code of civil pro-



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cedure and (*d*) the code of criminal procedure, both of which have been promulgated; and (*e*) the commercial code, part of which has been put into force.

These codes, Dr. Wang said, have been prepared with the assistance of foreign experts, and are based on the principles of modern jurisprudence. Among the numerous supplementary laws special mention might be made of a law of 1918, called Rules for the Application of Foreign Laws, which deals with matters relating to private international law. Under these rules, foreign law is given ample application. Then there is a new system of law courts established in 1910. The judges are all modern, trained lawyers, and no one can be appointed a judge unless he has attained the requisite legal training. These are some of the reforms which have been carried out in China.

It is not claimed that the Chinese laws and their administration have reached such a state that there is no room for improvement, but as yet no nation can boast of a perfect law, and the creation of the commission contemplated could have hastened and encouraged further reform in this direction. Since the Shanghai tragedy China has been asking for the immediate relinquishment of extraterritoriality.

At the Washington Conference a resolution was

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also adopted to the effect that all foreign postal agencies in China, except those "in leased territories or as otherwise specifically provided by treaty," should be withdrawn not later than January 1, 1923. The other powers one by one acted in pursuance of their resolution, but Japan, pleading geographical proximity as well as enormity of mails exchanged between her and China, persistently urged that a Sino-Japanese postal conference be convened with a view to arriving at some special postal arrangements for the benefit of the nationals of both countries.

After agreement by the Chinese government, such a conference was held between the representatives of the two countries, and as a result four agreements were signed bearing the date of December 8, 1922, and covering the exchange of (*a*) correspondence, (*b*) money orders, (*c*) parcels, and (*d*) insured letters and boxes. Everything went off very smoothly, except the question of the withdrawal of Japanese postal agencies in the South Manchuria Railway zone.

The Japanese delegation contended that this question had already been decided by the Washington Conference, and that these postal agencies should be retained. The Chinese delegation, however, insisted that the Japanese position was un-

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tenable as, in conformity with the Washington resolution, of the foreign postal agencies in China only those "in leased territories or otherwise specifically provided by treaty" might be exempted, while the South Manchuria Railway zone was not, and could not be construed as a leased territory, nor were there any specific treaties authorizing the establishment therein of any Japanese post-offices.

Though there was not much formal discussion on this question, the Japanese delegation contended that it, being rather of a political nature, was not within the sphere of the Conference, which view was finally shared by the Chinese delegation. As it appeared that no definite result could be obtained thereon and in order that the question should not become a stumbling-block to the success of the Conference, it was eventually agreed that the *status quo* of the said Japanese postal agencies should be provisionally maintained, and that "the relations between the Japanese and the Chinese post-offices in the South Manchuria Railway zone should be governed by the same terms as were laid down in the postal agreements of 1910, pending a final decision through some future diplomatic negotiations."

What has been said is perhaps sufficient to show

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that the more important commitments of the Washington Conference, contrary to expectations, have not all been carried out, and one is led to the wish that America, as the convenor of the Conference, would take upon herself the responsibility of seeing that its commitments are fulfilled at an early date. It is noteworthy, however, that the decisions reached by the Sino-Japanese Conference held collateral with the Washington Conference, which provided for the restoration of Kiaochow to China and the settlement of the Shantung question, all have been amicably carried into effect between the two Asiatic countries, China and Japan.

If there is any blemish in America's dealings with China it is found in the Chinese exclusion laws. In principle, China believes that the action of America in this matter is unjust. The treaty of 1868 made between China and America has the definite provision that the two countries cordially recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects, respectively, from one country to the other, for the purposes of curiosity, of trade, or of permanent residence. It further declares that the Chinese subjects visit-

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ing or residing in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nations. In 1880, upon the request of America, China entered into a new treaty in which she agreed that America might regulate, limit, or suspend the coming of Chinese, but might not absolutely prohibit it. Upon the basis of this treaty the American Congress passed a bill suspending Chinese immigration for twenty years, and later, yielding to the argument of President Arthur, reduced it to ten years.

Not satisfied with this, America once more sought for a new treaty with China aimed at a virtual prohibition of Chinese labor immigration. While the negotiations were going on Congress passed a bill absolutely prohibiting the immigration of Chinese laborers in glaring violation of the provisions of the treaty of 1880. The situation was somewhat rectified in 1894 by a new treaty, which permitted the exclusion of Chinese laborers for ten years, but upon the termination of that treaty, China, acting upon public opinion, gave due notice to the American government that it would not be renewed. Congress, ignoring the treaty rights of China, has since passed a law making permanent

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the exclusion of Chinese laborers from the United States, which has been made more strict by recent legislation. Thus the status of the Chinese in the United States is based not chiefly upon treaty engagements between China and America but upon American law and American interpretation of the law.

While fully appreciating the difficulties which have confronted the statesmen and legislators of this country and of other nations in dealing with this problem, the Chinese people—speaking very candidly—fail to see any justification of their violating treaty stipulations while insisting that China should fulfil hers, nor do they see any good reason why the nations of the world insist upon China's observance of the open-door policy while they close their own doors against the Chinese. If the adoption of exclusion laws is of absolute necessity, why has there been until recently a difference of treatment as between Chinese and Japanese, and why is there not a general law restricting labor immigration under a uniform standard, irrespective of race or color, instead of the policy of discrimination against a particular race or a particular country?

As the law now stands, the Chinese and other Asiatic peoples are debarred from the privilege of



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the so-called quota system on the ground that they are not entitled to naturalization, a privilege enjoyed by the white and black races but denied to the Asiatic races because they are neither white nor black. By the intelligent people of Asia this is generally regarded as an insult, and an unnecessary insult, for under the quota system there is no further danger of America's being overrun by the Asiatic races. Moreover, those who are familiar with the history of America remember that upon the discovery of America the Pilgrim forefathers dedicated it as a haven of refuge to the suffering and oppressed of the entire world, and that the principle that all men "are created equal" is one of the very first enunciations of the Declaration of Independence which the American people have just recently celebrated with patriotic feeling throughout the world.

The question may be raised: If this represents the Chinese attitude toward the American exclusion law, why is it that no agitation has been conducted in recent years for its abolition or modification?

On the part of China the answer is that the traditional friendship toward America is so overwhelmingly strong that the dissatisfaction over the immigration question is relegated to the back-

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ground. Moreover, the Chinese people believe that the immigration act does not represent the best opinions of the American people. Again China has been reluctant to see her laboring class migrate to countries where they are not welcomed, and where, through them, China is often misjudged. As her industrial enterprises expand and her own vast undeveloped regions open up, she can easily absorb into her own system all her surplus population from any overcrowded regions—at least for the next half-century. Indeed, within the last two decades no less than fifteen to twenty million people have migrated from their home provinces of Shantung, Chihli, and Honan to settle in the sparsely populated regions of the north and west, notably in Manchuria and Mongolia. Therefore, as a domestic question the problem of China's surplus millions will be automatically solved by the coming in of a new era of industrial progress. Not only will the number of emigrants seeking to make a humble living abroad be likely to decrease year by year, but it is hoped that those who have already left may return to their fatherland and help in its commercial and industrial progress. With China, then, the objection against the exclusion of labor immigration is not a question of necessity, but that of national honor and justice. Friends of

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America entertain the hope that the American people, who have always stood for international justice and fair play, will bring their influence to bear upon their legislators for a reconsideration of the immigration act, and that the day will come when the United States of its own accord will rectify its error by amending the existing exclusion law.

We now pass on to the consideration of China's economic relationship with America, which, in a way, is more important than the political. In fact, in an industrial age such as the present the foreign policy of a nation is very apt to be dictated and influenced by the demands of economic necessity. The insistence of the United States upon the open-door policy in China is itself prompted by economic considerations, for its observance insures for her an open market and equal treatment in all parts of China for trade and commerce as well as for profitable investment of American capital. Bearing this in mind, let us examine briefly two questions of economic bearing, namely, the new international banking consortium and China's trade relations with the United States.

The new international banking consortium, participated in by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, and formally organized in 1920,

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was proposed by the United States after the war. Its purpose is to finance all future loans to China, industrial as well as political, with a view to helping China in the establishment of her great public utilities, such as railways, canals, etc., thereby assisting in establishing China economically and financially. Those who first suggested the idea wanted to remove the evils which unrestrained international competition after the war would surely have brought about. They desired, also, to protect the future of Chinese national life by preventing the development of mutually exclusive spheres of influence which would tend to weaken if not to destroy the unity of China. However plausible those desires may seem to be, the consortium has not been received with favor by China. At least two objections are raised:

First, China objects to the monopolistic character of the consortium. Had it laid down new rules for the game of international finance in China, on a basis of free, fair, and friendly competition untainted with diplomatic pressure or political coercion, it could have become a potential instrument for good. But, as it was, the different banking groups went ahead to combine all their so-called vested interests in a consortium of four powers only, at the expense of an open door for

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other nations. Although such a common pool would insure for the four national banking groups the privilege of equal opportunity, it could be attained only at the expense of China's right of free bargaining. Furthermore, in designating "loans of a public character" emanating from the Chinese government as its exclusive option, the consortium has in effect substituted for the regional spheres of interest a fiscal sphere of interest. It is an absolute banking combination, a credit monopoly, so complete and overwhelming that little freedom would be left to China as a money-borrower.

Second, China objects to the political nature of the consortium. The method of financing as it is contemplated, having the backing of four controlling political bodies of the world, has the danger of infringing upon China's sovereign rights by taking China's public finance under foreign supervision or control, by granting the land tax of the nation as security for the loan and by making additional revenues flow into foreign banks acting as government depositaries. So long as foreign investment has more of a political than a business flavor, the Chinese will be unwilling to accept the loaning terms, feeling as they do that it is better to remain in national poverty than to suffer from a foreign financial yoke.

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Turning to trade relations, we find that indirect commercial relations between China and America had been existent long before the establishment of the United States as an independent nation. During Colonial days, Chinese tea, silk, and other articles had been regularly imported from England through the East India Company. But it was not until 1784, the year following the peace, that it first was made possible for an American ship under the American flag to cross the ocean in safety, carrying with her a cargo of ginseng and bringing back a cargo of tea. From that time until this day the trade between China and America has been prospering and expanding year after year. During the past century American imports from China, with only a few exceptional years, have been consistently greater in value than exports thereto. Yet the general tendency is for their difference to become smaller and smaller in proportion to the total trade because American exports to China have increased on the whole more rapidly than imports therefrom. Among the nations that now have commercial relations with China the United States occupies a position only next to Japan in importance, claiming 16 per cent of China's foreign trade as against 24 per cent for Japan and 11 per cent for Great Britain. As it is certain that



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there is to be a great trade expansion in China, so it is certain that the American share of the trade is to grow as time goes on.

It is to be noted, however, that while the general commercial relationship has remained the same, the trade currents between these two countries are distinctly changing. Relatively speaking exports of Chinese finished or consumers' goods, such as tea, silk, textiles, and other luxuries, are gradually decreasing, while the exports of raw and semi-raw materials, such as hides and skins, furs, straw-braids, wool, vegetable oils, and other great staples of the world's industry are increasing. This is because, on the one hand, the increasing activity of American industries results in more intense demands for these materials, and, on the other, China is able to supply the United States with a larger quantity of such articles as her agriculture and other forms of industry are gradually developing. As to American exports to China, we find that manufactured goods of the simpler forms such as flour, cotton cloth, manufactured tobacco, leather goods, and other simpler forms of manufacture, which formed the largest part of American exports to China in the past decades, are now decreasing in importance, both in absolute and in relative shares, owing to the fact that their place is being

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gradually taken by products of China's own industry, as well as those of Japan. On the other hand, American exports to China in iron and steel machinery and other manufactures, electrical appliances and materials, motor vehicles and other carriages, chemicals and drugs, and all other materials of the finer products of the highly developed American industries are rapidly increasing. The reason for such a rapid expansion along these lines can be readily found in the twofold fact that while China's demand for this industrial equipment and these provisions has greatly increased, due to her recent industrial development, the United States is now better able to supply China with these articles, due to the increased output of her various industries.

In the study of the trade relations between China and the United States Dr. S. L. Pau points out several significant features which are worthy of notice. One of them is the purity of motive which has characterized their commercial intercourse since its very beginning. There is no ulterior aim on the one side and no suspicion on the other, as contrasted with so much of these which has marked the history of China's trade with other powers. Here commerce is carried on with no other consideration than that of a legitimate profit of busi-

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ness. The Chinese are strictly a peaceful business people with a keen business sense. They perceive and appreciate and therefore do not hesitate to reiterate their desire for closer commercial relations with the Americans.

Identity of interest is another significant feature of the Chinese-American trade. The interests of China and those of the United States run along parallel lines with a peculiar consistency, and there is no fundamental conflict or clash to mar the development of their commercial intercourse. In fact, no two countries could be better qualified than the United States and China to co-operate with each other in bringing about the realization of the immense possibilities of trade in the Pacific and in effecting the economic development of East Asia to their mutual benefit.

The third feature is their interdependence. Everyone realizes that further development of the foreign trade of the United States in the future will to no small extent depend upon the extension of her market in China because, being a vast country of fabulously rich resources together with an immense population, China is the greatest potential market in the whole world. China, in turn, if she desires to have her vast resources developed and population enriched, must look mainly to the

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United States for the initial capital, for a large part of the machinery and equipment, and also for a reciprocal market, almost as unlimited as China's own, in which to dispose of her raw or semi-raw materials which the developed Chinese industries will turn out in the near future and of which American manufacturers will feel in great need.

There remains to be considered the cultural relationship between China and the United States, which is intimately bound up with political and economic questions and in a way is the most fundamental of all, though it has little or no interest for men of practical affairs in government or in business. In our study of the political, economic, and social tendencies we have observed that the culture of China has been undergoing a change since its contact with Western civilization. Although it is as yet too early to tell what is to be the ultimate result of this change, one thing seems to be certain, which is that if the Chinese people see to it that they assimilate only the best elements of Western civilization and reject those that are undesirable, they will be able to achieve an organic growth from the best of their own culture, producing a result having the merits of both. In the eagerness to affect change, there is however a danger of over-emphasizing the importance of Western culture

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at the expense of all that is really vital in the Chinese national life. Bertrand Russell sees two dangers to be avoided. The first danger is that they may become completely westernized, retaining nothing of what has hitherto distinguished them, adding merely one more to the restless, intelligent, industrial, and militaristic nations which now afflict this unfortunate planet. The second danger is that they may be driven in the course of resistance to foreign aggression, into an intense anti-foreign conservatism as regards everything except armaments.

Of all the nations having cultural relations with China, America has exerted the greatest influence. The earliest cultural relationship between China and America lies in the Christian missions. There is a tendency among some American people, enthusiastic about Christian missions, to suppose that the only force entering into the regeneration of China is that exerted by their missionary representatives. This is, of course, far from the truth, as there have been many external as well as internal forces affecting change in China. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the Christian movement did make a very valuable contribution to Chinese education and culture. The early missionaries were the pioneer educators, and their schools and

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colleges were the first modern educational institutions of China. The first president of the first government school in China was an American missionary by the name of Dr. A. P. Martin. To the early missionaries also must be given the credit of having translated and written a number of books on Western learning. The education of women first received attention in Christian missions. For some time some of the best-conducted colleges in China were maintained under the auspices of missions and supplied teachers to government schools and colleges. In the light of history they constitute an object lesson and a stimulus for the introduction of modern schools and colleges by the Chinese government and people.

During recent years Christian education has made great progress. The standards have been raised and the work is much better correlated and co-ordinated than in the days gone by. Nevertheless, with the growth of the Chinese educational system it no longer holds as important a position as it did once. The enrolment in Chinese schools in 1923 was 6,615,772 as against 558,953 in mission schools—a ratio of 8 to 1. Some of the strongest and best-conducted schools and colleges are under Chinese auspices. In view of this fact



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the question may be raised: Is there a continued demand for the existence of mission schools? Many hold the belief that for some time to come China will not be able to provide sufficient education for all the children of school age nor will she be able to reach the millions of her illiterates. Christian education can continue to supplement the efforts of the government in these directions. Even when the government is able to take care of all the work there will still be room for the existence of some schools and colleges under the mission or Christian auspices to meet special needs of the Christian community and to serve as a stimulus to government education, as it has done in the past. It seems desirable that Christian education should then emphasize quality instead of quantity and that instead of having many schools of mediocre or poor grade it should build up a few schools and colleges of the highest standard that may be models to other private and government institutions.

If there is a justification for the continued existence of mission schools then what are the causes of the existence of the so-called Anti-Christian Education Movement in China? Let us examine some of the criticisms and see if they are justifiable. It is claimed that the Christian school is a denationalizing force, tending to weaken the

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patriotism of the students and to make them subservient to the interests of foreign nations, and that it minimizes the importance of the Chinese language and gives undue emphasis to English. It is true that graduates of Christian schools in general are friendly to the missionaries and to the country which they represent, but they are certainly no less patriotic than students of government schools. The neglect of Chinese and the over-emphasis of English has been more or less true but is being remedied by the best of the Christian schools. Again, the contention is made that it is undemocratic to allow any section of a nation to send their children to other than the public schools. This criticism is the same as that which is raised in America against church parochial schools and other private schools and is not peculiar to China, and much may be said both in favor of and against such a contention. By far the chief reason, however, that has been advanced against Christian education is that the Christian school is used as an agency for propagating religion or as an evangelizing agency. To a certain extent this criticism is true. If we cannot expect Christian schools to give up their religious character, certainly it is reasonable to expect that the religious work of the Christian schools should be so con-

ducted that it does not interfere with the real educational work and sacrifice the best educational principles and practices.

What are some of the measures that have been proposed by Chinese educational bodies for the regulation of schools under foreign auspices? First, all schools under foreign auspices should be registered in the Ministry of Education and required to be subject to the supervision of the government. Second, such registration presupposes the fulfilment of certain government laws and regulations. Third, no preaching, religious teaching or worship should be allowed in the schools. It must be admitted that the first two measures proposed are reasonable and could be followed without difficulty on the part of mission schools, and that the real difficulty lies in the third proposal, which, however, can be partly overcome by making religious teaching and worship voluntary, instead of compulsory. As a whole, then, the Anti-Christian Education Movement is not as serious as it appears, and it may result in the improvement of Christian education in China.

That the Christian work is conducted on a large scale can be seen from the fact that some six thousand missionaries are engaged in educational and religious work in China and that over ten million

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dollars are contributed annually by Americans toward missionary and philanthropic work in China. In spite of the existence of anti-religious movements, and despite the mistakes made by Christian missions, one is led to say in all fairness that their work, taken as a whole, constitutes one of the important factors in the development of a new China.

There are other cultural relations between China and America. There has been a movement on the part of some American universities and colleges to have representatives in China engaged in educational enterprises. Thus Yale has been interested in Yale College in Changsha, Pennsylvania in the medical work of St. John's University in Shanghai, Oberlin has educational interests in Shansi, and Princeton in Peking. The international committees of Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., through the Chinese national and local organizations, have been exerting a moral and spiritual influence over the young men and young women of China. There is also the Peking Union Medical College, built, equipped, and maintained by the Rockefeller Foundation, providing the very highest standards of teaching, training, and research work in medicine, giving aid to various mission and government institutions, and co-operating with

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them in the promotion of the teaching of science and premedical education.

During the last few years an increasing number of American scholars, scientists, and teachers have successively made their visits to China and through their lectures and contacts with our intellectual leaders and students have exerted much influence upon Chinese thought-life. Dr. John Dewey's pragmatic philosophy of education has been one of the guiding principles in the reforms of Chinese elementary education. The visit of Dr. Paul Monroe has awakened interest in the reform of secondary education and in the teaching of science. Professor McCall, of Columbia University, spent a year in China and in co-operation with Chinese psychologists succeeded in the construction of some twenty educational tests and measurements for the use of elementary and secondary schools. Professor Twiss, of Ohio State University, spent two years in China for the improvement of the content and methods of science education in Chinese schools and made a scientific study of the problems connected with the reconstruction of the curriculum. These represent but a few of the significant contributions to the reconstruction of Chinese education by American scholars and scientists.

But perhaps the strongest, and most significant

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cultural relationship between China and America lies in the movement for sending Chinese students to America for higher education. Of all the Western nations America claims the largest number of Chinese students in her institutions of learning. This is partly because the distance from China to America is shorter than that to Europe, and partly because of the influence of the earlier students to the United States. But by far the chief reasons for this popularity of America are the return of the Boxer indemnity and her historical friendship with China. It is estimated that there are at least twenty-five hundred Chinese students now enrolled in American universities and colleges, and a greater number have returned to China and are working for the regeneration of their country. In spite of cases of failure and disappointment which have attended the career of individuals, to them as a class must be given the chief credit for the introduction of Western ideas and ideals, the institution of fundamental reforms, and the gradual transformation of the social and political order of the country along modern lines.

It is to be regretted that the cultural relationship between China and America has so far been more or less one-sided. Americans have gone out to China to teach, but few to learn. Many Chinese



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students have come to America to receive what America has to give, but few American students have been sent to China to receive what China has to offer. Millions of dollars are spent every year to educate the Chinese to know America, but comparatively little has been done to teach America to know China.

A recent study shows that while no less than 70 per cent of the news on China published in the American press and periodicals is devoted to political questions, only 15 per cent is devoted to educational and cultural matters, showing clearly that not enough attention has been given to China's educational and cultural life. Let us hope that this state of affairs may be speedily remedied so that the contact between these two nations may be fruitful to both parties, and that while China may learn from America her scientific knowledge, her efficiency, and her power and skill in handling human affairs, America may learn from China something of her attitude toward life, of tolerance, of ease, and of peace to mind. "When I went to China," says Bertrand Russell, "I went to teach; but every day that I stayed I thought less of what I had to teach them and more of what I had to learn from them."<sup>1</sup> It should be the responsibility

<sup>1</sup> *The Problem of China* (New York, 1922), p. 209.

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of the university to promote the study of Chinese civilization. In this study Chinese language, literature, art, and archaeology will naturally have their places, but the chief place should be given to Chinese history, economics, society, government, philosophy, and religion. A department of Chinese should be established in every great university of this land, and should be made a center of reliable information about China in the more recent years of her history.

Such, in brief, are China's relations with the United States. Taken as a whole, they are ties of mutual interest and of good will. Let us hope that these ties of friendship will be preserved and improved upon as the years go by, to the end that these two nations may continue to live in a happy state of friendship.



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
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




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